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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
Rule 43

(1) through

(4) of the Utah Supreme Court,

attached hereto as Appendix p. ii.

Rule
43.
Considerations
governing
review
of
certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor
wholly measuring the court's discretion, indicate the
character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same
of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of state or federal law in a
way that is in conflict with the decision of this
court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision that has so far departed from
the
accepted
and
usual
course
of
judicial
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a
departure by a lower court as to call for an
exercise of this court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state, or federal
law which has not been, but should be, settled by
this court.
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.)
Title

52 f

Chapter

4,

Utah

Code

Annotated,

1953

as

amended (Open and Public Meeting Act):
***

52-4-3. Meetings open to the public - Exceptions.
Every meeting is open to the public unless closed
pursuant to Sections 52-4-4 and 52-4-5.
***

52-4-6. Public notice of meetings.
(1) Any public body which holds regular meetings that
are scheduled in advance over the course of a year
shall give public notice at least once each year of its
annual meeting schedule as provided in this section.
The public notice shall specify the date, time, and
place of such meetings.
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of Subsection (1) of this section, each public body shall
give not less than 24 hours' public notice of the
agenda, date, time and place of each of its meetings.
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(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by:
(a) posting written notice at the principal
office of the public body, or if no such office
exists, at the building where the meeting is to be
held; and
(b) providing notice to at least one newspaper of
general
circulation
within
the
geographic
jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local
media correspondent.
(4) When because of unforeseen circumstances it is
necessary for a public body to hold an emergency
meeting to consider matters of an emergency or urgent
nature, the notice requirements of Section 52-4-6(2)
may be disregarded and the best notice practicable
given.
No such emergency meeting of a public body
shall be held unless an attempt has been made to notify
all of its members and a majority votes in the
affirmative to hold the meeting.
***

52-4-8.
Suit to void final action - LimitationExceptions.
Any final action taken in violation of Sections 52-4-3
and 52-4-6 is voidable by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Suit to void final action shall be
commenced within 90 days after the action except that
with respect to any final action concerning the
issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidences of
indebtedness suit shall be commenced within 30 days
after the action.
***

Title 42,

1983, U. S. Code (Civil Rights Act):

1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every
person who, under
color
of any
statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia. (R.S. 1979; Dec. 29, 1979, P.L. 96-170, 1,
93 Stat. 1284.)
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Laws of Utah 1987, Chapter 207:
AN ACT RELATING TO CITIES AMD TOWNS; DEFINING THE
POWERS OF CITIES AND TOWNS TO APPOINT AND REMOVE PUBLIC
SAFETY DEPARTMENT HEAD; DEFINING WHEN A PUBLIC SAFETY
DEPARTMENT HEAD MAY DISCIPLINE A SUBORDINATE; AND
MAKING TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953
AS FOLLOWS:
AMENDS: 10-3-916, AS LAST AMENDED BY THE CHAPTER 33,
LAWS OF UTAH 1983
REPEALS: 10-3-911, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 48, LAWS OF
UTAH 1977
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section Amended.
Section 10-3-916, Utah Code Annotated
last amended by Chapter 33, Laws of Utah
amended to read:

1953, as
1983, is

10-3-916.
Recorder, treasurer, marshal in cities of
third class and towns.
(1) In each city of the third class and town^ on or
before the first Monday in February following a
municipal election^ the mayor, with the advice and
consent of the city council, shall appoint a qualified
person to each of the offices of city recorder [ 7-] and
treasurer [;—and-mars-hatl] .
(2) The city recorder [aha-tlr-fo^] is ex officio the
city auditor and shall perform the duties of [sn±eh]
that office.
(3) The mayor, with the advice and consent of the
council, may also appoint and fill vacancies in all
[src*eb-eff±eers~atrcl--agents—a-&-may--be] offices provided
for by law or ordinance [;—exeept-as-etherwise-pirev-ided
by-taw] .
(4) All appointed officers shall continue in office
until their successors are appointed and qualified.
Section 2. Section Repealed.
Section 10-3-911, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
enacted by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah 1977, is repealed.
Section 10-3-911, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended:
10-3-911.

Repealed.
4

Section 10-3-916, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended:
10-3-916•
Appointment of recorder and treasurer in
cities of third class and towns - Vacancies in office.
(1) In each city of the third class and town, on or
before the first Monday in February following a
municipal election, the mayor, with the advice and
consent of the city council, shall appoint a qualified
person to each of the offices of city recorder and
treasurer,
(2) The city recorder is ex officio the city auditor
and shall perform the duties of that office.
(3) The mayor, with the advice and consent of the
council, may also appoint and fill vacancies in all
offices provided for by law or ordinance.
(4) All appointed officers shall continue in office
until their successors are appointed and qualified.

Hutchison vs. Cartwright, 692 P.2d 772-774 (Utah 1984), attache
hereto as Appendix pp. iii.l through iii.3.
Rice vs. Sioux

614, 99 L.Ed. 897

City Memorial Park Cemetery,

349 U.S. 70, 75 S.Ct.

(Iowa 1955), attached hereto as Appendix pp.

iv.1 through iv.7.
Southern Pacific

vs. Industrial Commission, 91 P. 2d 700

(Arizona

1939), attached hereto as Appendix pp. v.l through v.6.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

This is not a proper case for certiorari.
(a)

The case for which review is sought is both
academic and episodic.

(b)

There
Open

are
and

Chapter

no

justiciable

Public
4,

issues

Meetings

U.C.A.,

Act

1953,

about

the

(Title

52,

as

amended;

["Sunshine Law"]).
(c)

Richfield City's conduct demonstrates neither
past

nor

present

intention

to

violate

the

Sunshine Law.
(d)

Richfield City complied superabundantly

with

the Sunshine Law.
2.

This

Supreme

pertinent

Court

issues

of

has

previously

entitlement

to

decided
or

any

property

interest in future employment.
3.

Petitioner

is still

raising matters never urged

before the Court of original jurisdiction or in
any providing except for the first time before the
Court of Appeals. 1

1

So-called "Richfield City Policy Department, Policies and
Procedures Manual", a document
written by Ward
for his
subordinates without foundational evidence (of which there is
none) that it was ever adopted as an organic or legislative act
of Richfield City.
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INTRODUCTION
[STATEMENT OF THE CASE]
The Petitioner will be referred to as "Ward" and the
Respondents will be referred to collectively as "Richfield".
This is an action in which Ward seeks $250,000.00 in
general damages, $250,000.00 punitive damages, reinstatement as
Chief

of

Police, attorneys1

fees

and

other

relief

for his

dismissal as Richfield1s Chief of Police.
At a meeting held April 2, 1981 which was in complete
compliance with the Open and Public Meeting Act (Chapter 4 Title
52 "Sunshine Law") Richfield terminated Ward as its Chief of
Police.

Ward threatened a lawsuit because his dismissal was not

specifically mentioned on the agenda for the April 2nd meeting;
therefore, on June 8, 1981 Richfield held a meeting under a
posted and published agenda which specifically enumerated for
consideration the proposal to terminate Ward as Chief of Police.
Immediately

before

this meeting Richfield was

served with a

Temporary Restraining Order which the District Judge later held
should not have been issued or at its best (i.e.: if it ever had
any validity) expired by its own terms.

The District Court was

of the opinion that §10-3-911, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 applied
to 3rd class cities, divesting the court of jurisdiction, and the
restraining order should not have issued.

The no-jurisdiction

ruling was reversed in Ward vs. Richfield Citv, et al„ [Ward I] 716 P. 2d
265 (Utah 1984) .

We do not dispute the correctness of that

Decision.
7

NATURE OF THE CASE
Ward wants this Court of last resort to review a fully
considered and eminently well-reasoned, unanimous decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals which affirmed a Summary Judgment based on
uncontradicted affidavits before the District Court.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
As stated in Nature of the Case.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURTS
As stated in Nature of the Case.

(The Decision of the

Utah Court of Appeals dated June 14, 1989 is attached hereto as
Appendix pp. i.l - i.7.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Rule 43 does not suggest Certiorari in this Case.

The Petitioner is asking review by Certiorari to the Court of
Appeals

whose

thoroughly

well-reasoned

Opinion

treated

and

correctly applied all pertinent Utah statutory and common law and
federal and state precedents from all jurisdictions, especially
cases of the Utah Supreme Court which are stare decisis.
has

neither

special

nor

important

dimension

This case
sufficiently

significant to warrant review by certiorari.
2.

Utah's Open and Public Meeting ("Sunshine") Law was

not offended and needs no further interpretation by the Court;
especially as applied to this Case.
8

The facts in this case do

not involve or even suggest, let alone draw into question, any
ambiguity in the Sunshine Law,

As the Court of Appeals held,

even

occurred

if a technical violation

(which the Court of

Appeals held did not) it was promptly cured by appropriatethough quite possibly unnecessary - action by the City Council,
(Appendix p. i.4)
3.

The Utah Supreme Court has decided all tenure

issues relevant to this case.

Specifically in Hutchison vs. Cartwright,

692 P.2d 772-774 (Utah 1984), (Appendix pp. iii.l - iii.3) and in
other cases the Utah Supreme Court has held broadly and without
limitation that a Chief of Police has no right to notice, hearing
or a showing of cause on his dismissal.
4.

The Municipal Code (Title 10, U.C.A., 1953) has

been amended in many particulars making questions concerning the
Code moot.

The position held by Ward, "marshall" in a third

class city, is no longer a statutory office.

Construction of the

statute under which Ward claims would be the interpretation by
this Court of a repealed statute with no prospective precedential
consequence.
5.

"Rules and Regulations" under which Ward claims

tenure are neither supported by foundation nor proof of adoption;
were raised for the first time on appeal.

Ward attempts self-

levitation by asserting (for the first time on appeal) that rules
which he had personally authored gave him an expectancy of future
employment

or a right to a hearing, and

hearing, cause for dismissal.

requiring

at that

These "Rules" were never adopted
9

by the city legislators or otherwise acted upon by the City
Council.

They were rules composed by Ward by which he proposed

to govern his subordinates; and they do not even purport to
govern or by the most extreme extension affect the Chief of
Police (Marshal).

10

BRIEF OPPOSING CERTIORARI
Come now the Respondents, Richfield City, et al., and
respectfully oppose the granting of Certiorari in the captioned
case upon the grounds and for the following Reasons:
REASON I. CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED IN THIS CASE
FOR FAILURE TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE
43 OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT.
Rule 43 of the Utah Supreme Court ("Rule 43") codifies
the sound principle that review by writ of certiorari will be
granted
"only where there are special and important
reasons therefor."
[Supra pp. 1, 2 and
Infra; Appendix ii]
The

enumeration

paragraphs

(1)

through

controlling

nor measuring

of
(4)

the
of

indicators
Rule

43,

[the Supreme]

found

although

in

sub-

"neither

Court's discretion",

exclude Petitioner's case from the slightest justification for
consideration on certiorari to the Court of Appeals.
By making arguments of ineligibility

for certiorari

Respondents both respectfully and emphatically do not concede
that the Court of Appeals has decided this case incorrectly.
The United

States Supreme Court under

its Rule 17

(similar to Rule 43) in Rice vs. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S.

70, 75 S.Ct. 614, 99 L.Ed. 897 said:
A federal question raised by a petitioner may
be "of substance" in the sense that,
abstractly considered, it may present an
intellectually interesting and solid problem.
But this Court does not sit to satisfy a
scholarly interest in such issues. Nor does
11

it sit for the benefit of the particular
litigants. [Citations] "Special and important
reasons" imply a reach to a problem beyond
the academic or the episodic.
This case is both academic because the Utah Supreme
Court has held that the office of Sheriff (concomitant to that of
a Chief of Police) is subject to the appointing power's authority
t o d i s m i s s without hearing, n o t i c e or c a u s e , Hutchison vs. Cartwright,
692 P.2d 772 - 774 (Utah 1984); and episodic, because the rulings
only touch upon the Sunshine Law in the most tangential way;
i.e.: Ward was dismissed at a meeting when that particular action
was not specifically on the agenda.

If his dismissal does not

require a hearing, notice or cause then it does not need to be
the subject of formal action and therefor not the object of an
agenda.

Then, because Ward wanted to martial support by means of

the Sunshine Law (in his words) "significantly [to] influence the
public body"

(Brief p. 11) , the City accommodated him with a

posted and media-published agenda only to be met with an ex parte
Temporary Restraining Order

(hereinafter "TRO") interpreted by

Ward to say that the City could not attempt to hold a legal
meeting to dismiss him.
disingenuously.

Counsel handled this part of the case

[Ex-parte]

He could easily have made contact

with the City's attorney - he has been calling him regularly to
attempt settlement - but chose not to tell him that he was either
seeking or serving a TRO; rather, he chose to have it obtained on
June 7, 1981, and served just a few minutes before the June 8th
meeting without prior notice to the City or its attorney.

The

Trial Judge protected the City against chaos by striking from the
12

TRO, proposed and submitted to him by Ward's counsel, the words
"•••plaintiff [Ward] be and he is hereby reinstated as Chief of
Police pending a determination of the legal issues involved in
this litigation by this court."

After carefully reading the

Court-stricken sentence and the remainder of the TRO, the City
went about carefully not to violate it but only ratified what the
Council had done previously.

The TRO told the City to do nothing

further to terminate Ward.
The

City

appeared

in obedience

to

the

Show

Cause

Injunction of the TRO and the trial court dismissed the action.
This Court, as the Brief states, did reverse that ruling but only
on the ground that the Trial Court had erred in its holding that
it had no jurisdiction.

We do not argue, but to the contrary

agree, with that result.
This case went to the Federal Court purporting to be a
civil rights action where the U.S. District Court held that the
Civil Rights Act (Title 42 §1983, U.S. Code) will not be invoked
to redress violations of a State statute (here the Sunshine Law)
and also, to the extent that Amendment XIV to the United States
Constitution interdicts confiscatory action, that Ward had no
property

right

in his previously held office as a Chief of

Police; neither did he suffer loss of liberty through defamation
of his character.

[Per Winder, Judge, U.S. District Court for

Utah, (Appendix pp. vii.l - vii.9)]
This is about as episodic as a bi-jurisdictionally
dismissed case can become.
13

The Sioux City case (349 U.S. at 74) talks about a
demonstration that the public body was "willful" in its intent to
deny a constitutional

right

(per Justice Frankfurter)

"***at

least four members of the Court deemed that despite the rather
[sic] unique circumstances of the case Iowa's willingness to
enforce

the

restrictive

important'".

covenant

rendered

it

'special

and

[Emphasis added]

Richfield always acted without animosity but contrarily
with the highest concern and deference not only for Ward's legal
rights but also for his professional career.
The record is replete with the Richfield City Council's
repeated attempts to try to get Ward to change the possessive
regimentation of his policemen and other subordinate officers
that characterized his tenure; to "mend his ways"; relax his
stiffness

and

get

along

with

law

enforcement

work.

One

uncontradicted affidavit said the Mayor and Council "entreated"
Ward to relax his irresiliency so that he would be sufficiently
tractable

to work

including Ward.

with

his

men

for

the

good

of

everyone,

The Mayor and Council interviewed Ward at least

at the first (the challenged April 2, 1S)81) meeting instructing
him

to be

less

abrasive

and

militant

in his

attempts at

discipline or compulsory esprit de corps.
Holding a special meeting for which a super-abundant
effort was made to comply with the Open and Public Meeting Act
(Chapter 4, Title 52, U.C.A. 1953, as amended) is demonstrative
of

a willingness

on the part
14

of Richfield

City

to

observe

sedulously

the

Sunshine

Law.

The

City

Council

gave

Ward

everything he asked for respecting notice and opportunity to be
heard even though some of this may have been legally superfluous.
We respectfully represent to the Court that we are not
in any respect fearful of Petitioner's challenge fully to brief,
argue and present this case to the Court on certiorari; however,
it is one not deserving of this Court's attention.
It certainly does not fall within Ward's description of
the lower appellate court's treatment of the case where counsel
states that:
The high standards of the Utah State judicial
system and the rights of the Appellant demand
a more professional analysis. [Brief of Ward
on Petition for Rehearing before the Court of
Appeals, p. 15; (Appendix vii)]
We have the highest respect for this Court in its
office as the last resort for all appeals.
regard

for the perspicacity

Appeals.

We have similar

and scholarship of the Court of

We think that Ward might be correct that this Court may

organize an unexampled professional analysis; and at the same
time

we

do

not

think

that

this

degree

of

excellence, the

finiteness of time, and the purposes for which the Court of
Appeals was established justify certiorari to that Court of this
single-issue, episodic case.
This would be to review private litigation; in some
respects to be merely advisory, to speculate on what the Sunshine
Law means in respects not before this Court and re-constructing
what opinion the District Court held regarding his own Order to
15

Show Cause when he has already articulated what he thought of it
on re-examination.
REASON II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
SANCTIONS AGAINST THE CITY.
The

Court

IN

of Appeals correctly,

REFUSING
irrespective

of the

disparaging remarks made by Ward in his Petition for Certiorari,
made a scholarly analysis of the Sunshine Law.

They said (p. 4

of the Opinion [Appendix p. i.4])
Second, even if technical violations had
occurred in the April meeting, they were
subsequently cured. On June 5, notice of the
special session scheduled for June 8 was
provided to the local newspaper and the radio
station in compliance with the agenda and
notice provisions of section 52-4-6(3).
The
agenda for the June 8 meeting included Ward's
discharge and the media was notified more
than twenty-four hours in advance.
At the
June meeting, the Council voted without
opposition to ratify its actions taken at the
April meeting.
Ward argues that the action
taken at the June meeting violated the
temporary restraining order.2
The order
restrained the Council from taking further
action against him.
Richfield City argues
that the June meeting merely ratified action
that had already been taken and, therefore,
was not new action.
In
a
proceeding
for
violation
of
an
injunction, it is generally held that the
extent of the punishment rests in the sound
discretion of the court.
See Hensley v.
Board of Education, 210 Kan. 858, 504 P.2d
184, 189 (1972); People v. Mulgrew. 19 111.
App. 3d 327, 311 N.E.2d 378, 383 (1974).
"The inherent power of a court rendering a
permanent injunction to enforce its decree
and to modify or revoke the injunction for
equitable reasons due to changed conditions
is generally recognized . . . ."
Mulgrew,
311 N.E.2d at 382. The trial court held that
it was not in the public's best interest to
void the action taken by the Council in
16

terminating Ward.
We will not disturb
judgments in injunction proceedings that rest
within the sound discretion of the trier of
facts, unless an abuse of discretion clearly
appears from the record.
See Hensley, 504
P.2d at 188.
2

Ward asserts that he would have mobilized
supporters had he known the Council
planned on taking action despite the
temporary restraining order.
However,
the Council was under no duty to notify
Ward personally of its intended action.

REASON III. THE CLAIMED MERITS OF THIS CASE
ACADEMIC,
HAVING
BEEN
DECIDED
HUTCHISON

VS.

CARTWRIGHT,

692

P. 2D

ARE
BY
772

(UTAH 1984).
In Hutchison vs. Cartwright, 692 P. 2d 772, (Utah, Nov. 14,
1984) the Utah Supreme Court, and after it had decided the Ward I
case, in a unanimous opinion held that in the absence of a
statute requiring cause for dismissal the officer or board which
had made the appointment has authority to suspend or dismiss the
appointee (in Hutchison a jailer) "without charges, notice, or
hearing",

[emphasis

appointment

supplied] because

or dismissal

expressly

unless

the statute on

so provides, that officer

serves "at the pleasure" of the appointing authority.
Hutchison

claimed

in his

lawsuit that he had been

dismissed by the sheriff who had no authority to effect the
dismissal and primarily that he was entitled to notice and a
hearing.
Justice Zimmerman at pages 773 and 774 of 692 P. 2d
writes:
This issue was considered in Sheriff of Salt
17

Lake County vs. Board of Commissioners of
Salt Lake County, 71 Utah 593, 268 P.783
(1928).
There the Court dealt with the
question of whether county commissioners
could suspend or dismiss deputy sheriffs
against the will of the sheriff.
***The
Court stated that unless otherwise controlled
by statute, the power to suspend or dismiss
is appurtenant to the power to appoint. When
an individual is appointed by an official,
"the office is held during the pleasure of
the authority making the appointment and . .
no notice or charges or hearings are
required for the suspension or removal by the
authority appointing the officer."
71 Utah
at 596, 268 P. at 784. [Emphasis added]
[For the Court's convenience we have attached a copy of
the Hutchison Decision as Appendix pp. iii.l - iii.3]
The

Federal

Court,

although

not

controlling

but

nevertheless helpful, has said that Ward has no right to the
expectancy of future employment by the City.
REASON IV. AMENDMENTS TO THE MUNICIPAL CODE MAKE THE
QUESTION PRESENTED HERE ABSTRACT AND THE
ALREADY ABSTRACT QUESTION MOOT.
The law respecting appointment and removal of public
safety department heads in cities of the third class and towns
has been sharply amended; so sharply that to write an opinion on
the merits of this case would be to tr€>at an entirely academic
and repealed, now hypothetical code provision
Chapter

207

[Senate

effective April

Bill No. 154 passed

27, 1987]).

The

(Laws of Utah 1987
February

enactment

25, 1987,

of this chapter

eliminates any need for the Supreme Court of the State of Utah to
interpret §10-3-916.

Chapter 207 of the Forty-Sixth Legislature

also repeals §10-3-911.

In the United States Supreme Court case
18

of Rice vs. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, (supra) the pointlessness of

reviewing by

certiorari

a lower court's

interpretation

of a

superceded statute is emphasized (75 S.Ct. 617, 618, 349 U.S. 7779)•

In the Rice case it is notable that the United States Supreme

Court had already granted certiorari, nevertheless certiorari was
dismissed as "improvidently granted11 (75 S.Ct. 618, 349 U.S. 77)
and no decision made or opinion written.
REASON V. THE SUNSHINE LAW DOES NOT MAKE ANY ACTION
VOID.
Section 52-4-8 states that "any final action taken in
violation

of

§52-4-3

or

competent jurisdiction".

§52-4-6

is voidable by

a court of

No one can seriously suggest that the

Sixth Judicial District Court does not possess jurisdictional
competency.

If municipal, administrative, legislative, or rule-

making action is voidable by a court of competent jurisdiction it
is ordinarily presumed that the court has broad and usually
undisturbable discretion to apply a form of validity. Ordinarily
an act, proceeding, or legislative measure, if "voidable", can be
ratified (as in the case of the other party affected) or affirmed
(as in the case of the party whose act is deficient) Southern Pacific
vs.

Industrial

Commission. 91

P. 2d

700

(Arizona

1939);

however,

in this case the legislature expressly chose the term "voidable"
to be distinguished from the word "void".

We make this statement

largely in response to Ward's assertion that the action of April
2nd was "void" and therefore irremediable.

Although of minor

consequence we make the counter-argument that the statute itself
19

contemplates circumstances where the action can be remedied by
reaffirmation or ratification.

Even where the word "void" is

employed by the legislature it is ordinarily construed by the
courts as having the more liberal meaning of "voidable". Southern
Pacific vs. Industrial Commission, 91 P. 2d 700 (Arizona 1939).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons we respectfully suggest that
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah not issue a Writ of
Certiorari

to

the

Court

of

Appeals;

this

case

not

having

dimensions either "special" or "important" under Rule 43, Rules
of The Utah Supreme Court.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSEN, McX|T & CHAMBERLAIN
BY.
Ken Chamberlain
Attorneys for Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four (4) copies of the foregoing
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari were mailed to
George E. Brown, Jr. Attorney for Petitioner, 7001 South 900
East, Suite 240, Midvale, Utah (84047), by U.S. regular mail,
postage prepaid, this 7th day of Septembe^v. 1989.
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DAVIDSON, Judge:
This appeal concerns whether appellant, Boyd Ward, was
properly dismissed as Richfield C ity Chief of Police. Ward
claimed below that the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act was
violated, that the Richfield City Council disregarded a
temporary restraining order by ta king further subsequent
action to dismiss him as Chief of Police, and that his request
for an administrative appeal was improperly denied. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of Richfield City. We
affirm.
FACTS
On April 2, 1981, the Richfield City Council held a public
meeting after publishing an agenda as required by Utah Code
Ann. § 52-4-6 (1981). The agenda did not list Ward's
discharge as Chief of Police. Following discussion of items
on the agenda, the Council voted to hold a closed meeting and

invited Ward to join them in discussing his position as Chief
of Police. The Council was concerned about several recent
resignations within the police department. Discussion of
Ward's termination ensued and the Council decided to terminate
Ward. The Council resumed open session and formally voted to
discharge Ward effective April 3, 1981.
On April 6, 1981, Ward submitted a written request to the
Council for an administrative appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§ 10-3-1105 and -1106 (1981). The request was denied. On
June 5, 1981, the Council published notice that a special
meeting would be held on June 8, 1981, to ratify its actions
taken at the April meeting. The Council published an agenda
that included Ward's discharge as an item for discussion.
Prior to the meeting, Ward served the Council with a temporary
restraining order, to restrain it from taking any further
action against him. Despite the temporary restraining order,
the Council ratified its decision to terminate Ward.
On June 17, 1981, the trial court held a preliminary
injunction hearing and determined that pursuant to the removal
statute for chiefs of police, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-911
(repealed 1987), it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter.
Section 10-3-911 stated in part that "[t]he chief of police or
fire department of the cities may at any time be removed,
without a trial, hearing or opportunity to be heard, by the
board of commissioners whenever in its opinion the good of the
service will be served thereby."
Ward appealed the trial court's decision to the Utah
Supreme Court and the court decided in Ward v. Richfield City,
716 P.2d 265 (Utah 1984), that the trial court did have
jurisdiction because section 10-3-911 did not pertain to third
class cities. The case was remanded to the trial court. On
remand, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Richfield City. The court ruled that although the agenda for
the April 2, 1981 meeting did not include the termination of
Ward as Chief of Police, nevertheless, it was not in the public
interest to void the Council's action at either the April 2 or
the June 8 meeting.
Ward contends on appeal that: (1) the Council violated the
Utah Open and Public. Meetings Act in the April 2, 1981 meeting;
(2) the Council, on June 8, 1981, acted in violation of the
temporary restraining order; (3) the Council wrongfully denied
him the right to appeal his discharge; (4) the trial court
erroneously applied the law in granting summary judgment in

favor of Richfield City; and (5) he is entitled to
reinstatement, back pay and damages.
UTAH OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT
We first examine whether the Council violated the Utah Open
and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-4-1 to -9 (1981),
at the April 2, 1981 meeting and if so, whether the June 8
meeting cured any such violation. The purpose of the Utah Open
and Public Meetings Act is to ensure that the actions of the
state, its agencies, and political subdivisions are conducted
openly. £££ Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Serv. Comm'n,
598 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1979). Political subdivisions, as defined
in Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-201 (1981), include municipal
corporations and municipalities. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-601
(1981) provides that all meetings of the governing body of each
municipality shall be held in compliance with the provisions of
the open and public meetings law.
Ward contends that Richfield City failed to comply with the
agenda and notice provisions of the open meetings law and that
such failure should void the action taken at the April
meeting. Ward argues that the subject of his discharge should
have been listed on the agenda, even if discussions regarding
him were conducted in a closed meeting. This contention fails
for two reasons. First, the open meetings act designates
certain subjects which are exempt from discussion in open
meetings. See section 52-4-5. Where at least two-thirds of
the public body present at an open meeting vote to hold a
closed meeting to discuss the character, professional
competence, or physical or mental health of an individual, then
a closed meeting may be held. See section 52-4-4. The Council
voted in the April open meeting to sequester themselves to
discuss Ward's professional competence in compliance with
section 52-4-4. The Council concluded the closed meeting with
a unanimous vote, one member abstaining, to discharge Ward.
Minutes of the closed meeting were recorded and when the
Council resumed open session, a formal vote to discharge Ward
was taken.1
1. Prior to the closed session, the Council asked whether
anyone present wanted to be notified if open session resumed.
Most of those present were members of the media and they
responded that they did not necessarily desire to return, but
wanted to be advised if action were taken.

Second, even if technical violations had occurred in the
April meeting, they were subsequently cured. On June 5, notice
of the special session scheduled for June 8 was provided to the
local newspaper and the radio station in compliance with the
agenda and notice provisions of section 52-4-6(3). The agenda
for the June 8 meeting included Ward's discharge and the media
was notified more than twenty-four hours in advance. At the
June meeting, the Council voted without opposition to ratify
its actions taken at the April meeting. Ward argues that the
action taken at the June meeting violated the temporary
restraining order.2 The order restrained the Council from
taking any further action against him. Richfield City argues
that the June meeting merely ratified action that had already
been taken and, therefore, was not new action.
In a proceeding for violation of an injunction, it is
generally held that the extent of the punishment rests in the
sound discretion of the court. See Hensley v. Board of
Education, 210 Kan. 858, 504 P.2d 184, 189 (1972); People v.
Mulgrew, 19 111. App. 3d 327, 311 N.E.2d 378, 383 (1974). T h e
inherent power of a court rendering a permanent injunction to
enforce its decree and to modify or revoke the injunction for
equitable reasons due to changed conditions is generally
recognized . . . ." Mularew, 311 N.E.2d at 382. The trial
court held that it was not in the public's best interest to
void the action taken by the Council in terminating Ward. We
will not disturb judgments in injunction proceedings that rest
within the sound discretion of the trier of facts, unless an
abuse of discretion clearly appears from the record. See
Hensley* 504 P.2d at 188.
RIGHT TO APPEAL DISCHARGE
The Mayor, with the advice and consent of the Council,
appointed Ward to the position of Richfield City Chief of
Police, pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 10-3-916 (1981). This
same body had the authority to dismiss Ward, without a hearing,
notice, or cause. In Hutchison v. Cartwrioht, 692 P.2d 772,
773-774 (Utah 1984), the court held that unless otherwise
controlled by statute, the power to suspend or dismiss is
2. Ward asserts that he would have mobilized supporters had he
known the Council planned on taking action despite the
temporary restraining order. However, the council was under no
duty to notify Ward personally of its intended action.

appurtenant to the power to appoint. "When an individual is
appointed by an official# 'the office is held during the
pleasure of the authority making the appointment, and . . . no
notice or charges or hearings are required for the suspension
or removal by the authority appointing the officer.1" Id. at
774 (quoting Sheriff of Salt Lake County v. Board of Comers,
71 Utah 593, 268 P. 783, 784 (1928)). "The rule of common law
was that the appointment to municipal office carried with it no
vested property interest in continued employment, and such
officers were subject to removal without cause, reason or
hearing unless otherwise prescribed." Carlson v. Bratton, 681
P.2d 1333, 1337 (Wyo. 1984). Since the Utah Supreme Court
determined that section 10-3-911 did not apply, there is not an
applicable statute explicitly governing the dismissal of chiefs
of police or city marshals in third class cities,3
Therefore, based on common law, we conclude that the Mayor and
the Council had independent authority to discharge Ward,
without a hearing, notice or cause.
Ward, nevertheless, contends that he has a right to appeal
his discharge under sections
10-3-1105 and -1106. Section
10-3-1105 provides that "[a]11 appointive officers and
employees of municipalities, other than members of the police
departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and
superintendents, shall hold their employment without limitation
of time, being subject to discharge or dismissal only as.
hereinafter provided." (Emphasis added.) Ward argues that he
does not fall within the exception because he is not a member
of a "police department" per se, but a city marshal with
appointed assistants. However, we read sections 10-3-1105 and
-1106 as specifically excluding him. Other sections in chapter
10 use the term "chief of police" interchangeably with "city
marshal." See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918 (1986). As

3. Ward contends that the trial court erroneously applied Utah
Code Ann. § 10-6-32 which was repealed in 1977. This section
provided for the term of employment and removal of appointed
officers, without cause, in first, second and third class
cities. This section was not replaced with a statute expressly
directing the removal of chiefs of police in third class
cities. However, in light of our analysis that Ward does not
have a right to appeal and that he can be removed without
cause, we find that the trial court, nevertheless, reached the
correct result. Therefore, the trial court*s application of
section 10-6-32 was harmless error.

Chief of Police, we hold that Hard is both a member of a
"police department" and the head of that "department."
Ward also argues that even if he falls within the
exception to section 10-3-1105 because he is a chief of
police, nevertheless, the language in the second sentence of
section 10-3-1106 applies to "any officer." Because these
sections must be read together and should harmonize with the

purpose of the whole act, Jensen Y» Interroountain Health Care,
IflSLu, 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984), we hold that the language
"as hereinafter provided" in section 10-3-1105 specifically
modifies the sections that follow. "Separate parts of [an]
act should not be construed in isolation from the rest of the

act." id. fiaa al&SL Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth«# 618 p.2d
480, 481 (Utah 1980). Therefore, "any officer" as appears in
section 10-3-1106 must mean any officer not excluded in
section 10-3-1105.
Our holding is in keeping with the rationale behind the
power to discharge a chief of police without a hearing,
notice, or cause. Since the chief of police is appointed to
carry out the policies of the mayor "[t]he position of chief
of police is clearly recognized as different than that of any
other position in the police department for the obvious reason
that the chief of police is in a position of making and
carrying out policy for the mayor." Carlson, 681 P.2d at
1335.
The result is there is no protected property interest
in the position of chief of police, id. at 1337.4

4. Ward contends that he has a right to appeal under the
"Richfield City Police Department Policies and Procedures
Manual." The pertinent sections of the manual provide that a
member of the department may request a review of disciplinary
action by submitting a written request to the chief of police
and that dismissals are subject to appeal to the Richfield
City Appeals Board. However, these sections specifically
pertain to officers under the supervision of the chief of
police and not to the chief himself.

The summary judgment is affirmed.

C2-U e£L±A~
Richard C. Davidson, Judge

WE CONCUR:

880713-CA

7

Rule 42

RC ;L£S OF i i «: t r \ H SI T R E M E COI "R r

TITLE VI JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO COURT OF APPEALS.
Rule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees n-i"
Court of Appeals.
Unless otherwise provided by law, t h e review of a j u d g m e n t , an order, and a
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the S u p r e m e Court of U t a h
(Added, effective April 20, 1987 )

Hule 43, Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, b u t of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while n e i t h e r controlling nor wholly m e a s u r i n g t h e
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of t h e Court of Appeals h a s rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of a n o t h e r panel of the Coi irt of Appeals on t h e
same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this
court;
(3) When a panel of the C o u r t of Appeals h a s rendered a decision t h a t
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by this court.
(Added, effective Ar->- ' 20, 1987.)

Rule 4i, Certification aiid transmission of record; filing;
parties,
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the petitioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 45, pay the certiorari docketing
fee and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule 21, ten copies of a
petition which shall comply in all respects with Rule 46. The ease then will be
placed on the certiorari docket of the court. Counsel for the petitioner shall
serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party separately represented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties in
the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket number of the case
Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21.
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; a n y one
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of t h e m may join
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases.
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c e r t i f i e s that this P e t i o n for R e h e a r i n g is m a d e ir: gocd
w i t h o u t any intent to d e l a y the p r o c e e d i n g s h e r e i n .

hereby
faith

George7E. Brown, Jr.
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was truly driving in a weaving pattern.
He stated that during the high-speed chase
defendant 'was kind of taking in the middle of the road all the say [sic], pretty well
except he's [sic] once in awhile get just a
little too close to the shoulder and it would
pull him over" and that defendant "got too
close to the shoulder of the road and we
about lost it." It was unclear whether the
officer was referring to the right or left
shoulder. Certainly driving in the middle
of the road but occasionally getting close to
the right shoulder is consistent with how a
person would drive at high speeds. This
testimony does not describe a weaving pattern where the driver goes from one side of
the highway to the other or even from one
lane to another. Officer Stoneking's testimony, standing alone, is insufficient to support a guilty verdict. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction of driving under the
influence of alcohol.
We remand the case for a new trial on
the charge of evading a police officer. No
costs awarded.
HALL,. CJ and STEWART, DURHAM
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
SZ\
V_ > > v v w **

Clarence E, HUTCHISON, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
V.

C. Lynn CARTWRIGHT, Beaver County
Sheriff, and Board of Commissioners of
Beaver County, State of Utah, Defend
ants and Respondents.
^

18954.

Supreme i^-iir: -f • u r
Nov 14, \v-\
County jailer brought action against
county sheriff and board of commissioners
alleging that he was wrongfully suspended
and subsequently dismissed from his posi

tion. The Fifth District Court, Beav<*r
County, J. Harlan Burns,, J., entered suit*.
mary judgment for defendants, and plain*
tiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Zim»
merman, J., held that: (1) sheriff had caua§
and authority to dismiss plaintiff withoq|
concurrence of board of commissioners; (2)
sheriff had not relinquished his power to
summarily discharge by utilizing county
grievance procedure as a mechanism for
adjudicating issues raised by the terming
tion;- and (3) plaintiffs suspension and dig.
missal gave rise to no claims for violations
of the open meetings law.
Affirmed.
1. Master and Servant e=30(4)
Municipal Corporations <§=> 185(1)
Prisons <3>7
County jailer's conduct at deposition in
civil action in which he was a defendant,
which was marked by conflict with both
plaintiffs attorney and attorney provided
by court to represent him, provided cause
for sheriff to dismiss him,
2. Municipal Corporations <s=>185(3)
Prisons <s=*7
Sheriff, who had authority to hire
county jailer, had authority to dismiss him
without approval of county board of commissioners.
3. Municipal Corporations §=>185(3)
Prisons <5=*7
Sheriffs choice to utilize county grievance procedure as mechanism for adjudicating issues raised by his termination of t
jailer did not constitute a relinquishment of
his po\* er to summarily discharge.
4. Counties <fc=>52
Prisons <3=7
Because sheriff had independent authority to discharge county jailer for misconduct or other cause, no action by county
commissioners was necessary for jailer's
suspension or dismissal to become effective
and, therefore, any meetings held or actions taken by the commissioner were irrelevant to legality of the suspension and
dismissal which, therefore, gave rise to no
claims for violations of open meetings law.
I I.C.A. 1953, 52-4-1 et seq., 52 4S.

* \KiWKu.Hr
ClUM&*2P2d m

t\t:

:. .

d.tah 1»4>

Willard R. Bishop, f\»dar Ot> f* *r plainIn -irly March, following an investigation of the matter and discussion with the
tiff and appellant.
Beaver County Commission, Cartwright
John 0. Christiansen, County Atty,, Bea
wrote appellant and stated that he was
ver, for defendants and respondents
making the suspension permanent. In response, appellant filed a formal grievance
Z1M>
-UN, Justice:
under the provisions of the Beaver County
Appellant seeks reversal of a summary Personnel Policy for improper suspension
judgment rejecting his claim that he was and termination of employment, seeking
wrongfully suspended and subsequently reinstatement and payment of lost wages.
dismissed from his position as Beaver The grievance was heard before the Beaver
County jailer, that the proper Beaver Coun- County Commission on April 1, 1982. All
ty policies and procedures were not fol- parties were present. Appellant was not
lowed in his discharge, that the state's reinstated. He sought judicial review in
open meetings law was not complied with, the district court for Beaver County, raisand that he was entitled to reinstatement ing the same issues presented for our conand damages. We affirm the trial court. sideration on appeal. The district court
In 1976, Clarence E. Hutchison, appel- entered summary judgment against him on
lant, was hired as a deputy sheriff and all claims, finding that all necessary procejailer by the then Beaver County sheriff. dures for his suspension and dismissal
Dale E. Nelson. Nelson later died and was were followed.
replaced by respondent G. Lynn Cart[1] Appellant's initial contention is that
wright. In May of 1981, Cartwright termithe sheriff had no authority to dismiss him
nated appellant's employment as a deputy
without cause and without the concurrence
sheriff, although appellant continued as
of the Beaver County Board of Commiscounty jailer.
sioners. This argument lacks merit First,
On February 11, 1982, appellant's deposi- the record establishes that appellant's mistion was taken in a civil action in which conduct precipitated his dismissal. Appelappellant was a named defendant. Appel- lant failed to controvert Cartwright's statelant's conduct at the deposition was mark- ment that he engaged in "serious conflict
ed by conflict with both the plaintiffs at- and argument" with counsel for Beaver
torney and the attorney provided by Bea- County at the February 11th deposition.
ver County to represent him. (The briefs This Court has previously recognized that a
and record are silent regarding the nature sheriff may dismiss a deputy where the
of the suit and the details of the conflicts deputy "has been guilty of misconduct
arising at the deposition.) Five days later, . . . . " Fowler v. Gillman, 76 Utah 414,
after a meeting of respondent Beaver 429, 290 P. 358, 364 (1930).
County Commission that was attended by
Cartwright, Cartwright told appellant he
[2] Second, the sheriff ^ d authority itwas suspended from his position as county dismiss appellant w-tnout tne approval •>:'
jailer. Three days later, Cartwright con- the board of commissioners. This issue
firmed in writing that he had suspended was considered in Sheriff of Salt Lake
appeflant, citing as justification relevant Coun(ij v. Board of Commissioners of
provisions of the Beaver County Personnel Salt Lake County, 71 Utah 593, 268 P. 783
Policy. Those provisions outline available (1928). There the Court dealt with the
disciplinary procedures for county person- question of whether county commissioners
nel and provide that an employee is subject could suspend or dismiss deputy sheriffs
to "immediate dismissal" for "[indulging against the will of the sheriff. In holding
in offensive conduct or using offensive lan- that the commissioners could not, the Court
guage toward the public or toward the stated that unless otherwise controlled by
County officers or employees."
statute, the power to suspend or dismiss is
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appurtenant to the power to appoint.
When an individual is appointed by an official, "the office is held during the pleasure
of the authority making the appointment,
and
no notice or charges or hearings
are required for the suspension or removal
by the authority appointing the officer."
71 Utah at 596, 268 P. at 784. In the case
at bar, the authority to hire and to dismiss
appellant for misconduct or other cause
rests not with the Beaver County Board of
Commissioners, as appellant argues, but
with the sheriff, who had the authority to
and did hire appellant as a deputy and a
jailer
13! Appellant next contends that whether or not the sheriff lmtialh had the right
to suspend or discharge him. the sheriff
voluntarily limited his authority by adopting the Beaver f oimty Pemoline! Policy as
the internal puhcy >JL tin- sheriffs department. Appellant arsrue* that the sher ff is,
therefore, bour.o by those rules relating to
discipline, suspension, and termination.
Appellant's contention fails. While in this
particular case the sheriff chose to utilize
the Beaver County grievance procedure as
a mechanism for adjudicating the issues
raised by this termination, nothing in the
record indicates that thi> was other than a
one-time occurrence. No evidence before
us even suggests that the county's policies
and procedures were adopted and ratified
either formally or informally by the sheriff
as binding on his department in all cases.
Nor is there anything in the record suggesting that any county ordinance adopted
by the Beaver County Commissioners made
the policy applicable to the sheriffs department The mere utilization of part of a
county procedure by the sheriff in one particular instance cannot be equated with
adoption of the entire policy of which that
procedure is a part. Under such circumstances, we cannot say that the sheriff has
relinquished his power to summarily discharge.
1. Tht* ttah legislature ha^ enacted a statute governing the hiring and firing of deputv sheriffs,
and it appears to applv to the facts of this case.
U.C.A., 1953. § 17-30^1 (1973 cd.). However,
neither party referred to or relied upon the

IrisKKIKS

[41 Finally, appellant contends that respondents failed to comply with the notice
provision of Utah's Open and Publk Meetings Act and that such failure gave appellant the right to bring suit to void the
action taken at an improperly held meeting,
to wit: appellant's suspension and termination. U.C.A., 1953, § 52-4~€ (1981 ed.).
However, because the sheriff had independent authority to discharge appellant for
misconduct or other cause, no action by the
county commissioners was necessary for
the suspension or dismissal to become effective. Therefore, any meetings held or
actions taken by the commissioners were
irrelevant to the legality of appellant's suspension and subsequent dismissal. His
suspension and dismissal gave rise U) no
claims for violations of the open meetings
law.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm.
HAIL (\U STEWART, HOWL and
DURHAM, JJ , concur.

Darrell NIELSEN

Plaintiff,

v.
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Board of Review, Industrial
Commission of Utah, and Edward R.
Beale, Defendants
\ o 19169
Supreme Court of I tah
Nov 14 WS4
On reuew of award of unemployment
compensation, the Supreme Court held that
statute in tht proceedings belou, therefore u-e
cannot consider it on appeal. Bible v. First
Motional Bank of Rawlms, 21 An? App M 515
P.2d 351. 353 (1974); see. e.g., Warner i Ol*en,
25 Utah 2d 366. 482 P.2d 702 (1971).
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349 VS.

TO

Evelyn RICE, Petitioner,
v.

SIOUX CITY MEMORIAL PARK
CEM3TERY, Inc., et »L
No. 2*.
Argued Nov, 8, 9, 1954.
Decided May 9, 1955.
Action for damages for private cemetery's refusal to permit burial of plaintiff's alleged non-Caucasian husband in
burial lot purchased by plaintiff under
contract restricting burial privileges to
members of Caucasian race. The District Court, Woodbury County. Iowa, rendered judgment for defendants, and plaintiff ap:*-;-.! d. The Supreme- Court of
Iowa, 60 NAV.2d 110. afiirmvd the judgment, and p'ai'Hiff cbrair.ed certiorari.
"47 U.S. 942. 74 S.Ct. tttS. S< L.Ed. 1091.
The Supreme Court. 348 U.S. 880, 75
S.Ct. 122, affirmed by a divided court,
and plaintiff petitioned for rehearing.
On rehearing, the Supreme Court, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, held that where it
appeared that new Iowa Statute prohibiting the denial of burial solely because of race or color of deceased would
afford remedy in cases such as that at
bar. certiorari would be dismissed as
improvidently granted, even though full
argument had been had.
Order vacated and writ of certiorari
dismissed,
Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Chief Justice
Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented
JL Constitutional Law C=209f 251

[349 U.S.J

3. Courts 0=397 4
"Special aud important reasons'*
within Rule relating to granting of certiorari, relate to problems beyond the
academic or episodic, especially where
issues involved reach constitutional dimensions. Rules of Supreme Court, rule
19, 28 U.S.C.A.
Seo publication Words and Fhrases,
for other judicial constructions and defirvfi--vis of "Special and Important Rea-

4. Constitutional 'Law 0 4 6 U )

Supreme Court has duty to avcid
decision of constitutional issues unless
avoidance becomes evasion.
5. Cemeteries C=16
Violation of Iowa Statute prohibiting the denial of privil-e-r oi :nr».m-::-.r.
solely because of decedent's race or color
gives vise to a civil action for dair/ac:--.
as well as invoking statutory penalties.
I.C.A. §§ 566A.1 to 566A.11.
6. Courts 0=3974

Where it appeared to Supreme Court,
while considering petition for rehearing
on review of Iowa Supreme Court decision upholding defense based on provision in contract for sale of cemetery
lot limiting right of interment to those
of Causasian race, that recently-enacted
Iowa Statute prohibiting the denial of
burial solely because of race or color of
deceased would afford remedy in cases
such as that at bar, certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted, even
though full argument had been had.
Rules of Supreme Court, rule 19, 28 U.S.
C.A.; I.C.A. §§ 566A.1 to 566A.11; U.S.
C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14

Protection of the Fourteenth Amendment can be invoked only if a state de- 7. Courts 0 3 9 7 » j
prives any person or denies enforcement
Certiorari should not be granted exof a right guaranteed. U.S.C.A.Const. cept in cases involving principles the
Amend. 14.
settlement of which is of importance to
public, as distinguished from that of
2, Courts C=397'2
Supreme Court does not sit to satisfy parties, and in cases where the;re is a
a scholarly interest in intellectually in- real and embarrassing conflict of opinteresting and solid problems, nor for the ion and authority between Courts of
Appeal
benefit of particular litigants.

IY MEMORIAL

[349
On F^ution :
Mr, Lowell C Kmuiif.
r petitioner.

>:OUH'

Mr-. Jesse E. M/WM. . .
Iowa, for respondents.
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unenforceable as a
.i n of the Constitutions and public poiicy of Iowa and
City, Town.
the United States. Nevertheless,

.-

..

71

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action for damages brought
by plaintiff, petitioner here, in the District Court of Woodbury County, Iowa,
to compensate her for mental suffering
claimed to flow from defendant cemetery's refusal to bury her husband, a
Winnebajaro Indian, after services had
been conducted at the grave site and the
burial party had disbanded. Plaintiff
founded her action, so far as here relevant on br<r;u-h nf a centred whereby
defendant had undertaken to aiTord pL:*::tiff "Rltrht of Sepulture" in a specified
lot of :ts cemetery. The contract of sale
of the burial lot also provided that

it held
that the clause "may be relied upon as a
defense" and that "the action of a state
or federal court in permitting a defendant to stand upon the terms of its contract and to defend this action in court
would not constitute state or federal action" contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. It again ruled that
the United Nations Charter was irrelevant, and the case was finally dismissed.

The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed, reasoning that the decision of this
Court in Shelley v. Kraemer. 334 U.S. 1,
68 S.Ct. 836. 92 L.Ed. 1161, when considered in conjunction with the In re
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct.
i v 27 L.Ed. $:-.";. d:d r..-t i\.[t: : re a state
court to ignore such a provision in a contract when raised as a defense and in
effect to reform the contract by enforcing
it without regard to the clause. The
court further ruled that the provisions
"burial privileges accrue only to
of the United Nations Charter "have no
members of the Caucasian race."
bearing on the case" and that none of
60 N.\V.2d 112
the grounds based on local law sustained
Plaintiff asserted that this provision was the action. 245 Iowa, 147, 60 N.W.2d
void under both the Iowa and the United 110, 117. We granted certiorari, 347
States Constitutions and that recugni-* U.S. 542, 74 S.Ct. 638, 93 L.Ed. 1091.
tion of its validity would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. By an amendment
[1] The basis for petitioner's resort
to the complaint, plaintiff also claimed a
to
this Court was primarily the Fourviolation of the United Nations Charter.
teenth
Amendment, through the Due
The defense was anchored in the validity
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
of the clause as a bar to this action.
Only if a State deprives any person or
After an abortive attempt to remove denies him enforcement of a right guarthe case to the federal courts, D.C., 102 anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
F.Supp. 658, defendants moved to dis- can its protection be invoked. Such a
miss the amended petition in the state claim involves the threshold problem
court. This motion was denied, except whether, in the circumstances of this
that insofar as the amendment to the case, what Iowa, through its courts, did
petition had relied on the Unittd Nations amounted to "state action." This is a
Charter, the amendment was dismissed. complicated problem which for long has
Following Iowa procedure, the trial court divided opinion in this Court. See, e. g.,
entertained motions by both parties re- Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co.,
questing it to adjudicate prior to trial 207 U.S. 20, 28 S.Ct. 7, 52 L.Ed. 78;
points of law relating to the effect of Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 64 S.Ct.
the restrictive covenant. The Iowa court 397, 88 L.Ed. 497; Terry v. Adams, 345
ruled that the clause was not void but was U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct 809, 97 L.Ed. 1152.

616

75 SUPREME COURT REPORTER

See, also, Barrows \ ] \vK -on, M6 VS.
249, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L Ed. 1586. Were
this hurdle cleared, the ultimate substantive question, whether in the circumstances of this case the action complained of was condemned by the Fourteenth Amendment, would in turn present no easy constitutional problem.

[349 U 3,]

tiorari, we have considered am-w it>th~
er this case is one in which "there are
special and important reasons" for granting the writ of certiorari, as required
by Supreme Court Rule 19, 28 I'S.C.A.

[2 -4] This Rule, formulated 30 years
ago, embodies the criteria, developed
ever since the Evarts Act of 1891, by
73
which the Couit determines whether a
The case was argued here and the particular case
stark fact is that the Court was evenly
merits consideration,
divided. 348 U.S. 880, 75 S.Ct. 122. In
accordance with undeviating practice, no with due regard to the proper functionindication was given regarding the ing of the limited reviewing power to
which this Court is confined, decisively
grounds of this division.
restricted through the creation of the
In addition to the familiar though vex- intermediate Courts of Appeals and more
ing problem* of constitutional law, there largely confined by the Judiciary Act of
was refer* r^e in the opir/ons of the Iowa 1025. In illustrating the character of
courts and in the briefs of counsel to reasons which may be deemed "special
the United Nations Charier. The low a and iinj tr:..nC\ the Pwule rti\r> *^ '.ases

language of this Treaty, which so far as
the United States is concerned is itself
an exercise of the treaty-making power
under the Constitution, constituted a
limitation on the rights of the States and
of persons otherwise reserved to them
under the Constitution. It is a redundancy to add that there is, of course, no basis
for any inference that the division of
thib Court rejected any diversity of opin-'
ion on this question.
Following our affirmance by necessity
of the decision of the Iowa Supreme
Court, a petition was filed for a rehearing
before a full Court, In our consideration
of this petition our attention has now
been focused upon an Iowa statute enacted since the commencement of this litigation Though it was in existence at the
time the case first came here, it \\aa then
not seen in proper focus because blanketed by the issues of ''state action" and
constitution..! power for which our interest was enlisted. This Iowa statute bars
the ultimate question presented in this
case from ana in arising in that State.
In light of this fact and the standards
governing the exercise of our discretionary power of review upon writ of cer-

da i-, utral qut
theretofore determined by this court,
or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with applicable decisions of this court."
A federal question raised by a petit oner
may be "of substance" in the senst th it,
abstractly considered, it may present an
intellectually interesting and sr>Vd problem. But this Court dors not sit to satisfy a scholarly interest in such i^ues.
Nor docs it sit for the benefit of the particular litigants. Magnum Import Co.
v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163, 43 S.Ct. 531,
532, 67 L.Ed. 922; see also Address of
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, before the
American Bar Association, Sept. 7, 1949,
69 Sup.Ct. v, vi; Address of Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes, before the American Law
Institute, May 10, 1934, XI Proc.Am.Law
Inst. 313. "Special and important reasons" imply a reach to a problem beyond
the academic or the episodic. This is especially true where the issues involved
reach constitutional dimensions, for then
there comes into play regard for the
Court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes
evasion. Cf. the classic rules for such
avoidance stated by Mr Justice Brandeis
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ti "

in Ashvvandtr v- Tenru^see Valley Auth-\
ority* 297 U.S. 2883 341, 56 S.CL 466, 480,1
gO L Ed. 688.
J
in the present case, certiorari wai
granted, according to our practice, because at least four members of the Court
deemed that despite the rather unique
circumstances of this case Iowa's willingness to enfoice this restrictive covenant rtndtret] it ".fecial and important"
75

We were unmindful at the time
of Iowa's corrective legislation and of
its implications. While that statute had
been cited in the opinion of the Iowa
Supreme Court, without quotation, in
tangential support of a substantive argument, and while similar passing referenees appear in respondent's briefs in
o; p o t i o n to the petition and on the
r ^ i v - it wa< in* *\,n c u : ; ^ + . 1 a> a
j . tr' . : >v OII -i ivr t ^ r5 .ir- ">
] .rtaiue wa< r<«t put m l u e n u v i r g perspective, and it did not emerge to significance in the sifting process through
which the annual hundreds of petitions
for certiorari pass. Argument at the
Bar was concerned with other issues and
the even division of the Court forestalled
that intensive study attendant upon opinion-writing which might well have revealed the crucial relevance of the statute.
[5] These oversights should not now
be compounded by further disregard of
the impact of this enactment when viewed in the light of settled Iowa law, not
previously brought to our attention, concerning its effect upon private litigation.
The statute provides:
"Section 1. Any corporation or
other form of organization organized
or engaging in the business under
the laws of the state of Iowa, or
wheresoever organized and engaging
in the business in the state of Iowa,
of the ownership, maintenance or
operation of a cemetery * * *
e x e r t * * * churches ir r L .
ligious or established fraternal M>
cieties, or incorporated cities or
towns or other political subdivisions
75 S Ct —3*4

of the state ot lo.\a 4 *
.rail
be subject to the provisions of this
chapter
#

i

i

i

i

i

Ser 8 It shall be unlawful for
an> organization subject to the provisions of this chapter to deny the
privilege of interment of the remains
of any deceased person in any cemett i y * * * sok ly b*c tuse
78

of the
luce or color of such deceased person. Any contract, agreement, deed,
covenant, restriction or charter provision at any time entered into, or
by-law, rule or reeulation adopted
or put in force, either subsequent
or prior to the effective dat* of this
chapter, authorizing, peimuting or
requiring any organization subject
to *hc ;<ro\ ^icn- i thu- t ; 4 *ptfr to
utu-e ui iav.e or cOiur ui ^aui debased person is hereby declared to
bi» null and void and in conflict with
the public policy of this state.
"Sec. 9 Any person, firm or corporation Molating any of the provisions of this chapter, shail, upon
conviction, be pun^hable by a fine
of not less than t\\tin\-fi\e dollar*
($25'On» nor more than one hundred dollars < $100 00).
•

#

#

*

<

"Sec. 12 Nothing in this Act contained shall affect the rights of any
parties to any pending htiration.
"Approved April 21, 1953." Iowa
Laws 1953, c. 84; Iowa Code Ann.
§§ 566A.1 to 566A 11
\$ X result of this Act, in an> other case
arising under similar circumstances not
only would the statutory penalties be applicable, but also, undnr Iowa 'aw, ytie
in petitioner's position would be entitled to recover damages in a ci\il action based on a violation of the statute.
See Humburd v. Crawford, 12S Iowa 743,
105 N.W. 330; Brown v. J. H. Bell Co.,
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14o Iu\va S3, 123 N W 2M, 124 S W.
Such factors are among the many
901, 27 L.R.A..N.S., 407; Amos v. Prom. which must be weighed in the exercia*
Inc., D.C.N.D.Iowa, 117 F Supp. 615.
of that "sound judicial discretion" which
Rule 13 requires. We have taken thia
Ha i Mir il.itu't' t f en
'y brought opportunity to explain their relevance,
to our attention and n.v u»oe thereby when normally, for obvious reasons in
put into proper focus, the case would view of our volume of business, no opinhave assumed such an isolated signifi- ion accompanies dismissal of a writ aa
cance that it would
improvidently granted, because of the
apt illustration here provided of the
77
kinds of considerations, beyond those
hardly have been listed by Rule 19 as illustrative but not
1
brought here in the first instance. Any exhaustive, which preclude adjudication
adjudication of the constitutional claims on the merits of cases which may have
pressed by petitioner would now be an the surface appearance of public in poi adjudication under circumstances not tance.
promotive of the very social considera[6, 7] We are therefore of fbe opintions which evidently inspired the Iowa
Legislature to provide against the kind ion that this Court's order 01 November
of di-ciimination of which complaint is 15, 1954. affirming by an equally divided
here made. On the one hand, we should Court the decision of the Iowa Supreme
hi^it^ie t«*> ] a.-s judcm^nt on Iowa for Court, must be vacated and the uri: of
ur.v^n*titii?innal action, v * i\ such lu be c t*rt :r*i\iri dismissed as improviciemiy
uu::<i. wl en it ha3 already rtc'ified any ^ : v ;LJ. TN re is nothing u:.UK*e T, „:
possible error. On the other hand, we such
78
should not unnecessarily discourage such
dismi>sal even after full argument.
remedial action by possible condonation There have been more than sixty such
of this isolated incident. Moreover, the cases and on occasion full opinions have
evident difficulties of the case suggest accompanied the dismissal.5 The circumthat, in the absence of compelling reason, stances of this case may be different and
we should not risk inconclusive and di- more unusual. But this
visive disposition of a case when time
79
may further illumine or completely outimpre^ive pracmode the issues in dispute.
tice pro\es that the Court has not hca1. Ct. District of Columbia v. Sweeney. 310
U.S. «U51. GO S.Ct. UK 1 , S4 LEd. 1402,
where certiorari was denied "m view of
the fact that the tax is laid under a
statute which has been repealed and the
question ?s therefore not of public imI>ortance."
2.

United States v. Rimer, 220 U.S. 347,
31 S.Ct. 506, 55 L-Ed. 57S; Furness,
Withy & Co. v. Yang-Tsze Ins. A s s n .
242 U.S. 430, 37 S.Ct. 141, 61 L.Ed.
401): Tyrrell v. District of Columbia,
243 U.S. 1. 37 S.Ct. 301, 61 L.Ed. 557;
Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Goodrich,
245 U.S. 440. 3b S.Ct. 140, i52 L.Ed. 3N"»;
Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well
Works. Inc.. 261 U.S. 387. 43 S Ct. 422,
07 L.Ed. 712; Southern Power Co. v.
North Carolina Public S«T\«*i»* C i.t 4Jt;;j
U.S. 508, 44 S.Ct. 101. Ob L.Ed. 413;
Keller v. Adams-Campbell Co., 204 U.S.
314, 44 S.Ct 356, 68 L.Ed. 705; Davis T.
Currie, 266 U.S. 182, 45 S.Ct. 88, 69 L.
Ed. 234; Erie R. Co. v. Kirk^ndall, 206

'U.S. 1<*. 45 S.Ct. 33. 69 L.Ed. 236;
Southern California EdNnn Co. v. Herminghaus, 275 U.S. 486, 4S S.Ct. 27. 72
L.Ed. 387 ; Mellon v. MeKinley, 275 U.S.
492. 4S S.Ct. 34, 72 L.Ed. 390; MissouriKansas-Texas R, Co. y. State of Texas,
275 U S. 494, 48 S.Ct. 82, 72 L.Ed. 391;
Ellison v. Koswi*. 276 U.S. 598, 625, 48
S.Ct. 320, 72 L.Ed. 724; Johnson v.
Thornburgh, 276 U.S. 601. 48 S.Ct. 322,
72 L.Ed. 725; Carter Oil Co. v. Eh, 277
V.S. 573. 48 S.Ct. 435, 72 L.Ed. 994;
St mdard Pipe Line Co. v. Commi>Moner- of Index Sulphur Drainage Disk,
27* U S . 55S. 49 S Ct. 17. 73 L.Ed. 504;
Si aboard Air Line R. Co. v. Johh-un
(New York. Chicago & S t L. R. Co. v.
< I ran fell) 278 L\S, 576, 49 S.Ct. 95, 73
L.Ed. 515; Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v.
Saunders. 27S V.S. 581, 49 S.Ct 184,
73 LEd. 51b, Virg'nian R. Co. v. K.rk.
273 U.S. 582, 49 S.Ct 185, 73 L.Ed. 5lb;
Wallace v. Motor Products Corp., 279
U.S. 589, 49 S.Ct 21, 73 L.Ed. 522;
Sutter y. Midland Valley R. Co.. 280
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itated to dismiss a writ even at this ad"If it be suggested that as much
vanced stage where it appears on further
effort and time as we have given to
deliberation, induced by new considerathe consideration of the alleged contions, that the case is not appropriate flict would have enabled us to disfor adjudication. In the words of Mr.
pose of the case before us on the
Chief Justice Taft, speaking for a unanmerits, the answer is that it is very
imous Court:
important that we be consistent in
U.S. 521, 50 S.Ct. 05, 74 L.Ed. 500:
Anglo & London-Paris Nat. Bank of
San Francisco v. Consolidated Nat. Bank
of Tucson, 2S0 U.S. 526. 50 S.Ct. S7,
74 LEd. 593; Gulf. Mobile & N. R. Co.
y. Williams, 280 U.S. 520, 50 S.Ct. SO,
74 L.Ed. 593; Wisconsin Electric Co. v.
Dumore Co.. 2S2 U.S. 813, 51 S.Ct. 214,
75 L.Ed. 72S; Adam v. New York Trust
Co.. 282 U.S. 814, 51 S.Ct. 214, 75 L.Ed.
72$: Director* of Lands of Philippine
Islands v. Villa-Abrilk\ 2^3 U.S. 7^5,
51 S.Ct. 341, 75 L.Ed. 1413: Sanchez ?.
Forms. 2^3 V.$. 7 K 51 S.Ct. 400. 7.",
L.FA 1421; Kl-in. .T-.Ii-t vV E. R. Co.
v. C;.':r.^L:;!. L>4 V S. .*-!». "2 S.i't. l-'N.
70 L.Ed. 5 0 s ; Suo\vd« n v. Koi Iiivt-r
and Bayou Dos d a i s e s Levee and Drainage L»Ut. of Loiii>iana, 2^4 U.S. 592,
52 S.Ct. IAS, T<» L.Ed. 510; Lang v.
U:dt.-d Stai.-s. 2N» U S . .'23, "C S.Cr. 195.
70 L.Ed. 1207; Franklin-Anient an Tru>t
Co. r. St. Louis Union Trust Co.. 2^»
U.S. 533. 52 S.Ct. 042, 70 L.Ed. 1274;
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Parker,
287 U.S. 509. 53 S.Ct. 94, 77 L.Ed. 501;
Sevier Commission Co. v. Wallowa Nat.
Bank. 287 U.S. 575. 53 S.Ct. 120. 77 L.
Ed. 504: Fort Smith Suburban K. Co.
v. Kansas City Southern 11. Co.. 2^S
U.S. 567. 53 S.Ct. 85, 77 L.Ed. 513;
B«»ynt..»n v. Hutchinson Gas Co.. 292 U.S.
001. 54 S.Ct. 039. 7N L.Ed. 14<I4: Lyueh
v. People of New York ex rel. Pierson,
293 U.S. 52, 55 S.Ct. 10. 79 L.Ed. 191;
Hunt v. Western Casualty Co., 293 U.S.
530, 55 S.Ct. 2u7, 79 L.Ed. 03U; Fox
Film Corp. v. Muller. 294 U.S. 090. 55
S.Ct. 444, 79 L.Ed. 1234; State Automobile Ins. Ass'n v. Click, 294 U.S. 097,
55 S.Ct. 550, 79 L.Ed. 1235; Moor v,
Texas & N. O. R. Co., 297 U.S. 101,
50 S.Ct. 372, SO L.Ed. 509; Texas & N.
O. R. Co. v. Neill, 302 U.S. 045. 58
8.Ct. 118, 82 L.Ed. 501; Aetna Ins. Co.
v. Illinois Central R. Co., 302 U.S. 052, 53
S . C L 209, 32 L.Ed. 505; Tax Commission of Ohio v. Wilbur, 304 U.S. 544,
5s* S.Ct. 1030, S2 L.Ed. 151S; Goodman
v. United States, 305 U.S. 57S, 59 S.Ct.
303, 83 JLEd. 364; Goina •. United
States, 306 U.S. 622, 59 S.Ct. 783, 83

LEd. 1027: McGoldrick •. Gulf Oil
Corp., .309 U.S. 2, 00 S.Ct 375, 84 L.Ed.
536; Utilities Ins. Co. v. Potter, 312
U.S. 002, 01 S.Ct. 804, 85 L.Ed. 1109;
Harris v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust
Co.. 313 U.S. 541, 01 S.Ct. S40. 85 L.
Ed. 1509; Jones v. City of Opelika, 315
U.S. 782, 62 S.Ct. 630, S6 L.Ed. 1189;
Gorman v. Washington University, 310
U.S. 98, 62 S.Ct. 902, 86 L.Ed. 1300;
McCullough v. Kammeror Corp., 323
U.S. 327. 05 S.Ct. 2!>7. SO L.K.I. 273;
McCarthy v. Bruner, 323 U.S. 073, 65
S.Cr. 120. so L.Ed. 547; Wl.it- v. B a ^ u .
324 U.S. TOO, 05 S.Ct. 97S. *!> L.Ed.
134>-

W.M„I> v. Ni.T-rh,-;riKT, 32<

us.

211. tr, .v.Ct. 090. ;;O L.Ed. 1177; Phyie
v. IMiffy, 3.34 V*. 431. OS S.Ct. 1131.
92 L.Ed. 1494; I l ^ - e b e t h v. State of
North Carolina, 334 U.S. S00, OS S.Ct.
l W i . 92 L.Ed. 1739: Superior Court
of State of California v. Liih'floren, 335
U.S. 900. 09 S.Ct. 410. 93 L.Ed. 440;
Loft us v. People of ^tute of Illinois, 337
U.S. 935. 09 S.Ct. 1511. 93 L.Ed. 1741;
Parker v. Los Angeles County, 338 U.S.
327. 70 S.Ct. 101, 94 L.Ed. 144;
Ilammerstein v. Superior Court of California. 341 U.S. 491, 71 S.Ct 820. 95
L.E.I. 1135;
Sternbrid-jc v. State of
Georgia. 343 U.S. 541, 72 S.Ct. 834. 90
L.Ed. 1130: Edelman v. People of State
of Calif..rnia. 344 U.S. 357, 73 S.Ct. 293.
97 L.Ed. 367; Bcntseu v. Blackwell. 347
U.S. 925, 74 S.Ct. 528, 9S IxEd. 1078;
State of California ex rel. Brown v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 348 U.S. 932,
75 S.Ct. 354. This list is not to be
deemed comprehensive.
Only in the light of argument on the
merits did it become clear in these numerous cases that the petitions for certiorari should not have been granted.
In some instances an asserted conflict
turned oat to be illusory; in others, a
federal question was wanting or decision could be rested on a non-federal
ground; in a number, it became manifest
that the question was of importance
merely to the litigants and did not present an issue of immediate public significance.

S20

75 SUPREME COURT REPORTER

not granting the writ of certiorari
except in cases involving principles
the settlement of which is of importance to the public, as distinguished
from that of the parties, and in
cases where there is a real and embarrassing conflict of opinion and
authority between the Circuit Courts
of Appeals." Layne & Bowler Corp.
v. Western Well Works, Inc., 261
U.S. 387, 393, 43 S.Ct. 422, 423, 67
L.Ed. 712.

[349 TJ.8J

prompted us to take this case origintiu
We cannot agree that this dismissal U
justified merely because this petitioner U
the only one whose rights may have been
unconstitutionally denied.

Writ of certiorari dismissed.
The petition for rehearing is granted.
The order of this Court of November 15,
1954, affirming by necessity the
80

judgment
of the Supreme Court of Iowa is vacated
and the writ of certiorari is dismissed as
improvidently granted.
It is soci'd'.ivi.

349 U.S. 81

Robert Cecil BELL, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES \>t America.
No. 468.
Argued April 21, 1955.

Mr. Justice HARLAN took no part in
Defendant was convicted of violathe consideration or decision of this case. tion of the Mann Act and sentenced to
consecutive terms on each of two counts
of indictment. The United States DisMr. Justice BLACK, with whom THE
trict Court, Eastern District of TenCHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice nessee, Southern Division, denied deDOUGLAS join, dissenting.
fendant's motion to correct the sentence,
We think th:.t only very unusual cir- and defendant appealed. The District
cumstances can justify dismissal of cases Court judgment wa3 affirmed by the
on the ground that certiorari was im- United States Court of Appeals for the
providently granted. Our objections to Sixth Circuit, 213 F.2d 629, and desuch dismissals are stronger when, as fendant brought certiorari. The Suhere, a case has already been argued and preme Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
decided by the Court We do not agree held that transportation of two women
that the circumstances relied on by the on the same trip and in the same vehiCourt justify this dismissal. We grant- cle in violation of the Mann Act coned certiorari because serious questions stituted a single offense.
were raised concerning a denial of the
Reversed.
equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Those
Mr. Justice Minton, Mr. Chief Jusquestions remain undecided. The Court tice Warren and Mr. Justice Reed disdisTrusses the case because the Iowa Leg- sented.
islature has provided that every person
in Iowa except one who has already filed
a suit can prosecute claims like this. L Courts C=>383(1)
Apparently this law leaves everyone in
The United States Supreme Court
Iowa free to vindicate this kind oi right granted certiorari to review decision of
•except the petitioner. This raises a new Court of Appeals that defendant by
question of denial of equal protection of transporting two women in violation of
the laws equally as grave as those which Mann Act, though on same trip and in
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SOUTHERN PAC. CO. v. INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION i t l l
No. 4087.

Supreme Court of Arizona.
June 19, 1939.
1. Workmen's compensation $=»I027

Where a widow who la entitled to compensation has remarried and received a lump
settlement of the compensation award, a legal annulment of the marriage will entitle
her to have the original award reinstated
upon tendering back the amount she received as lump settlement

it of its authority.
2178.

Rev.Code IOCS, |§ 2100,

9. Statutes * » ! § »

The word "void," in Its strictest sense,
means that which has no force and effect,
is without legal efficacy, Is incapable of being enforced by law, or has no legal or
binding force, but frequently the word Is
used by the Legislature and construed by
the courts as having the more liberal meaning of "voidable." Rev.Code 1028, 5 2178.
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of
"Void," see Words & Phrases.]

10. Marriage $=>6
Physical incapacity for sexual inter2. Estoppel <§=*63
course usually does not render a marriage
Estoppel exists only when the party void, but voidable merely, and the marriage
sought to be estopped, with full knowledge is re-carded as valid until regularly dissolv<>f all the facts bearing on the situation, ed at the suit of the wronged party.
:..k-'- a pusiti'>n wu.ch is iueon-L-t:-jnt With
11. Marriage 0=38(1)
t«iie assumed later.
Tno W'-rd ••v.v.l," as u^d in «*?••?':•
3. Workmen's compensation C=>!027
a",:htu"i?.in? annulment of m-.i.-r..'^' \\1...r* Lu.iri .oil and actApt«'d 1 .i*:p i^ic*«.ii^ :.: ui
rhe compens;Uion award in full release, such
acceptance did not estop the widow from
asking for a reinstatement of the original
award after an annulment of her marriage.
4. Marriage &=*l

i». • i L . : n . . . ^ • < : ;

..i • " \ "

. . " ; . . ' . •

*

in oases of physical incompetent*, to marrinjres subject to ratification or disaffirmance by the injured party, as well as to
those which cannot be ratified. Rev.Code
1028, H 21G6, 217a

"Marriage" is a status created by and 12. Marriage C=58(2)
based upon a civil contract.
Und?r the annulment and dp'or^e ?!ntutc*s, physical incompetency is not a ground
[Ed. Note—For other definitions of
of a'n.uln: 'it, N:t u? di\or o oiJy. r« ".v.;.
•'Murrii.j.\ M See W t : : s & P:.r«* c.J
standing all oth»*r forms of vnn:a':ii#? mar5. Marriage <§=»!
rinses* are subject to annulment Kev.Code
The question of whether the status of VJ'^% H 21CG, 217S.
marriage aetuaiiy exists depends upon the
rules governing the making of the contract 13. Workmen's compensation €=»I027
Where widow entitled to compensation
upon which the status is founded.
remarried and accepted lump settlement of
6. Marriage C=M2
th^ compensation award and later secured
The essentials of t valid contract, that annulment of the marriage on ground husthe parties have capacity to enter into it band was physically incompetent, she could
and that they actually consent thereto, ap- not have lump settlement set aside and
ply to a marriage contract.
award reinstated, since physical incompetency of husband was not a ground for an7. Marriage $=358(1)
nulment authorized by law aud court grantUnder conruon law, where a marriage ing the annulment thereforp had no jurisdiccontract is proper iu form but is entered in- tion to do fio. Kev.Code 1^-5, $5 ~1U>, -17s.
to by parties wno have not capacity to consent thereto, or who have consented in form
but not in fact, the marriage contract may
Appeal by Certiorari from Industrial
be annulled.
Con.r/..—.on.
8. Marriage C=>58(l)

Proceeding under the Workmen's ComWhere a statute provides for what caus- pensation Act by Lorena O. Davis, apes court may annul a marriage, court will plictant, against the Southern Pacific Comlook to the statute as the measure and lim- pany and the Industrial Commission of

SOUTHERN PAC. CO. v. IXOl'STRlAL COMMISSION
f t P.M TOO

Arizona, L. C. Holmes, Sam Proctor and
Mortie Graham, as members of the Commission. From an award of the Industrial
Commission reinstating an award previously
made in favor of the applicant, the Southern Pacific Company appeals by certiorari,
Award set aside and case remanded.
„M .
. T
.
m
Baker & Whitney and Lawrence L.
Howe, all of Phoenix, for petitioner.
Riney B. Salmon and J. A. Riggins, Jr.,
both of Phoenix, for respondent Lorena O.
Davis.

Arix.

roi

voucher, for a small balance then due her
under the original award before her remarriage, and for the amount due as a
lump sum after remarriage. This voucher
showed on its face that it was made in full
settlement of the award. On February 10,
1938, the voucher was endorsed by her,
presented at the proper bank, and she rec c i v e d i t s full face amount.

Some five months later the beneficiary
filed a complaint in the superior court of
Maricopa County, praying for a divorce
from Ray Earl Menefee on the ground of
cruelty. About a month and a half later
LOCKWOOD, Judge.
an amended complaint was filed in the
Southern Pacific Company, a corpora- same court and cause, seeking a decree of
tion, the petitioner, has brought before us annulment instead of a decree of divorce.
for review an award of the Industrial As grounds for her suit for annulment,
Commission of Arizona, the respondent, she charged that Menefee was physically
reinstating a certain award previously incompetent at the time of the marriage.
rtade bv resworn lent in favor of Lorena O. and that such incompetence ha J c- ntir.uc-"
up to the time of the commencement of her
Ur.vis the ber.viiciarv.
action: that before marriage he had asd
e
t
c
r
m
!
*
"
!
.
"
;
*
The questions for on
:on are surrvi her he was competent; and that sh.rv for
?:

.:e trxm as follow^: On .\pril 14, 1926,
William A. Davis, the husband of Lorena
0. Davis, was in the employ of petitioner.
On that date, and in the course of his employment, he received injuries resulting
in his death. His widow made application
to respondent for an award for the support of herself and children, and on July
S, 1Q26, respondent awarded her the sum
of Sol.42 monthly for her support, which
payments were to continue urn! her death
or remarriage. In the latter event she was
to be paid a lump sum of $1,474.08, in final
settlement of the award. There were several minor children of the deceased, and
an award was made in their favor also,
but as they are now of age and their rights
are not involved in the present case, we
need not refer further to them.

ccr.;r..c: c::c:7t t-.r h:s frau^e::: stau merits and assurances. On the 8th of
August, 193S, the trial court granted to
her a decree of annulment of the marriage,
which reads, so far as material, as follows:
"The Court, being duly advised in the
premises, finds:
"That the allegations of the plaintiff's
complaint, all and singular, are true; that
the plaintirT is now and for more than one
year last past has been an actual and
bona fide resident of Maricopa County,
State of Arizona; that the plaintirT and
defendant entered into the contract of
marriage and the marriage ceremony at
Florence, Arizona, on the 20th day of
January, 1938; that there is no issue of
said marriage; that there is no community
property of the parties hereto; that at the
time of said marriage of plaintiff and defendant herein plaintiff was physically
incompetent, and that said incompetency
has continued to the time of the commencement of this action; that defendant induced said plaintiff to enter into said marriage contract by fraudulent statements
and assurances regarding his physical competency ; and that said marriage was
fraudulent in its inception, and therefore
null and void.

On January 20, 1938, the beneficiary intermarried with one Ray Earl Menefee, at
Florence, Arizona. A few days after
that date she advised petitioner and respondent of the fact and in evidence thereof delivered the latter certified copies of
the marriage certificate, including the return of the person solemnizing the rites,
and demanded of petitioner that it pay her
the lump sum above set forth, in final settlement of the award. The matter was
"Wherefore, it is ordered, adjudged and
presented to respondent, which approved
such settlement, and acting under this decreed: That the bonds of matrimony
advice and the request of the beneficiary, heretofore existing between plaintiff and
the petitioner delivered to her a negotiable defendant are hereby annulled, cancelled.
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set aside and held to have been null and
void; and that said plaintiff be, and she is
hereby granted a decree annulling said
marriage."
This decree was never appealed from,
nor brought before this court for review,
nor was there any attempt made to set it
aside in any court of competent jurisdiction. Thereafter, and on September 8,
1938, the beneficiary applied to the respondent, tendering back to the petitioner
herein the amount which she had received
as lump settlement, as aforesaid, and asking that the settlement be set aside and
that she be restored to her position under
the original findings and award as it existed before her marriage to Menefee.
Petitioner protested most strenuously
against the setting aside of the settlement
v : i the reinstatement oi *he awar 4 , and
the matter was heard before respondent.
stating the original award which rcq ;irw hereupon the matter was brought before
us for review.
[1] Petitioner raises several interesting and novel questions of law for our
consideration, and we deal with them in
what we consider their logical order. The
nrst is whether a widow to whom an
~v,-ari ci rr. v/.thly compensation is made,
.md who has received under our law a
kimn ST:in in settlement of the original
award upon a remarriage, may have such
original award reinstated upon tendering
back the amount of the lump settlement,
if the marriage has been annulled by a
court of competent jurisdiction.
The question is a new one in this state.
Xor have we been cited to many cases
bearing thereon. The one nearest thereto
in the factual situation is Eureka Block
Coal Co. v. Wells, S3 Ind.App. 181, 147
X.E. Sll, 812. Therein an award had
been made, as in the present case, of
monthly compensation, and the widow remarried. The marriage was afterwards
annulled, and she claimed she was entitled
to continued compensation as the widow of
the original claimant. The court said:
"Appellant points out that clause (e) of
section 3S of the Workmen's Compensation
Act (Acts 1919, p. 165), among other
things, provides that 'the dependency of a
widow » * * s hall terminate with
* * * her marriage subsequent to the
death of the employeV and with much
Earnestness contends that by reason of this

provision of the act the marriage of ap.
pcUec to McCormick, though voidable,
nevertheless was a marriage which terminated absolutely and permanently the
dependency of appellee as widow of James
E. Wells. We do not concur in this view.
Giving the provision referred to a broad
and liberal construction, as we must, a
marriage, within the meaning of the statute, is not a void or voidable marriage
which may at once be annulled, but a
valid and subsisting marriage."
The cases of Crummies Creek Coal Co.
v. Napier, 246 Ky. 569, 55 S.W.2d 339,
and Dodds v. Pittsburgh, M. & B. Rys.
Co., 107 Pa.Super. 20, 162 A. 486. by inference adopt the same rule. While in
both cases last cited, the court refused to
restore the original award of compensation, the opinions show clearly that it was
because the marr.ages in both case? had
not been Icci'ly annulled, and the implication :s that had the;. Ixeii, c :.. ~\^.;.
would have been restored. We ly.ii. th r—
fore. that '.\ht.n a w id-w who :s en*:*' .
to compensation under the Arizona law has
remarried and received a lump settlement
of the award, a legal annulment of the
marriage will entitle her to have the original award reinstated upon tendering back
the amount she has received as lump settlement.
[2, 3] The next question is whether the
receipt of a lump settlement urder the
directions of the respondent, with the understanding on the part of all panics that
such settlement was in full release and
satisfaction of all claims, estops the widow
from asking that the award be reinstated
after an annulment of her marriage.
In the case of Eureka Block Coal Co. T.
Wells, supra, which is the only one cited to
us where the original award was reinstated after the annulment of the marriage,
petitioner points out that the settlement
therein was a transaction between the parties, not made pursuant to an order of the
Industrial Board of Indiana, and urges
that had it been made pursuant to the order of the board, the original award would
not have been reinstated. We find nothing
in the opinion which sustains this conclusion. Estoppel only exists when the
party sought to be estopped, with full
knowledge of all the facts bearing on the
situation, takes a position which is inconsistent with one assumed later. In the
present case, there was nothing except surmise to show that the beneficiary had any
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knowledge at the time she made her set- tal incapacity, or want of consent gcneralticment of the facts upon which she later ly. Mattison v. Mattison, I Strob.Eq. 3§7,
based her suit for annulment. Under such 20 S.CEq. 387, 47 Am.Dcc. S41; Di
circumstances, we think the acceptance of Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467, 67
the lump settlement did not estop her from N.E. 63, 63 L.R.A. 92. 95 Am.St.Rep. 609.
^kmg for a reinstatement of the original Such proceedings, being based on a defect
award
in the original contract, necessarily imP U e d * Skiing t h a t *f ***™* ™« d i d
y become complete, while divorces
assume
* e original binding effect of the
contract but cancel it for some breach of
thc
conditions.
[8] In most of the states, however,
there are statutes which specifically set
forth the causes which will authorize an
annulment of a marriage, and it is quite
generally held that where a statute has
declared jurisdiction in this respect the
court will look to the statute as the mcasure and limit of its authority. Stierlen v.
Stierlen. 6 Cal.Anp. 420. 92 P. 329; 38 CJ.
[4-7] Marriage is a'ntost ur.iversr.lly 1349 and cases cued. The Arizona statute
said by the authorities to be a "civil con- STverning anrv::rr.er.t is contained in s^c.
-ITS. K.C, l ' C \ which is in this lancuaee:
}v soeakir.s-r. ir.4;ccur;ite. It may more

This brings us to the question which was
m ost strenuously urged by petitioner at the
hearing. It contended, and still contends,
that the marriage was not, under our law,
subject to annulment for the cause set
forth in the complaint, and that the trial
court, therefore, had no jurisdiction of the
matter. If this be true, then the judgment
is void on its face and subject to collateral
attack, and if there be no legal annulment
nor a possibility thereof, the marriage is
>till subsisting and the lump settlement
niust necessarily stand.

t :;h

l-.scd ur-on a civ:! c-:::rLv:;. Hd:c:i v.
Rovlance, 25 Utah 129. 69 P. 660, 5-?
L.R.A. 723, 95 Am.St.Rep. 821; 3S CJ.
1273 and cases cited. Since it is founded
upon contract, the question of whether the
status actually exists depends upon the
rules governing the making of the contract.
Two of the essentials of a valid contract
are that the parties have capacity to enter
into it, and that they actually consent
•.hereto, uiid !*":<»• i-j pr;r.c:T xs appiy :o Liie
contract upon which marriage is based.
It, therefore, follows logically that if a
marriage contract, though proper in form,
is entered into by parties who have not
die capacity to consent thereto, or who,
for some reason or another, have consented
in form but not in fact, the marriage contract may be set aside like any other one,
on the ground that the essentials are lacking. A judicial proceeding wherein it is
sought to establish that a marriage contract was lacking in some of its essentials
is called an annulment proceeding as distinguished from one which admits the
^r:g:na! validity of the marriage, but requests that the contract be declared breached by some conduct on the part of one of
the spouses which is inconsistent with its
terms. Annulment proceedings under the
-».mon law were, therefore, very generally based upon the equitable powers of
chancery courts to give relief in respect to
contracts generally in cases of fraud, men-

actual]

decree the marriage to be null and void,
where the cause alleged shall be an impediment rendering such contract void."
It is urged by petitioner that under this
section the only thing which will authorize
a decree of annulment is one of the causes
found in sec. 2166, R.C.192S. The section
reads as follows: "Prohibited end void
marriages.
The marriage of persons of
Caucasian Moo.], or their dcscer.datrs. wi:h
Negroes, Mongolians or Indians, and their
descendants, shall be null and void. The
marriage between parents and children, including grandparents and grandchildren of
every degree, between brothers and sisters,
of the one-half as well as of the whole
blood, and between uncles and nieces,
aunts and nephews, and between first
cousins are incestuous and void. Children
born out of wedlock, or the relations thereof, are included within the prohibition."
[9—11] It is contended by the beneficiary, on the other hand, and this theory was
adopted by respondent, that the word
"void", being the las: word of section 217S,
supra, really means "voidable" and that
her marriage was of that class.
Petitioner insists that the only marriage
contracts which may be annulled are those
which cannot, under any circumstances, become valid, while respondent claims that
annulment applies not only to contracts of
that nature, but to those which, though
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lack:::cr the vital element of consent, may
be ratified by the subsequent action of the
party who did not originally legally consent thereto. In the case of Kinney v.
Lundy, 11 Ariz. 75, 89 P. 496, 498, we
had occasion to discuss the meaning of the
word "void" when found in an act of
our legislature. Therein we said: " * *
Upon the meaning and construction to be
placed upon this word 'void/ as here used,
depends the determination of the question
before us. In the strictest sense 'void'
means that which has no force and effect.
The Century Dictionary gives the following as its definition specifically, in law:
'Without legal efficacy; incapable of being: enforced by law; having no legal or
binding force.' * * * But the courts
very generally have refused to accept this
narrower, stricter construction as the one
to he ad-r-ted as givincr proper eFect to the
intent in the minds of the person or body
m-'<:-<: u c e of the word in lccrd documents
or enactments, and have freer.-. utly con-

in the following language: "The district
court shall have power to hear and determine suits for the dissolution of marriage,
where the causes alleged therefor shall be
natural or incurable impotency of the body
at the time of entering into the marriage
contract, or any other impediment that renders such contract void, and shall have
power and authority to decree the marriage to be null and void." (Italics ours).
Paragraph 2111 of the same statutes
states the causes of divorce. Impotency
on the part of either party was not given
as one of them. In that year then it was
the obvious intention of the legislature
that impotency at the time of marriage
should be a ground of annulment, but not
of divorce. It is also plain that the legislature then did not intend to use the word
"void" in the annulment statute in its strict
sense, but rather meant "voidable", for
physical incapacity for sexual intercourse
usually does not render a marriage void,
but voidable m-'-r-Jy, and the nurr ; a:re ;<
r--:^.rde 1 ?.s v " : \ un'il re-zwlarlv e ; -t-d \ '.

construction seems more nearly to conform
to the probable intent in its use. * * * "

To the same effect is the case of Yancv
v. Jeffreys. 39 Ariz. 563. 8 P.2d 774. We
must, therefore, determine whether our
legislature, in section 2178, supra, meant to
use *ne word "void" in its more restricted
sense, which would cover only marriage
c-n.t.acts incapable of ratification, or whether it really meant the more liberal term
of "voidable", which would include also
those subject to ratification at the will of
the injured party, and if the latter be the
C"ce. whether the letr-iature itt'ended the
marriage of the benenciary to fall within
the annulment statute.

or herself wrontred. .Vartin v. Otis. 23?>
Mass. 491, 124 N.E. 2'?4. 6 A.L.R. 1340;
Kaiser v. Kaiser, 16 Hun.N.Y., 602;
Briggs v. Morgan, 3 Phill. 325, 161 Eng.
Rep. 1339; Bennett v. Bennett, 169 Ala.
618, 53 So. 986, L.R.A.1916C, 693.
Had the law remained as it was in 1S87.
there could be no question that the legislature meant to make any voidable marriage
subject to a::m:!m;nt, and that it r e o r nized physical impouncy as a pn<pc:
ground for such a proceeding, and not for
a divorce. In 1901, however, it again considered the subject, and substituted for
paragraphs 2110 and 2111, supra, paragraphs 3112 and 3113, of the Revised Statutes of 1901, the first dealing with annulment, and the second with divorce. It continued in effect the exact language of
paragraph 2110, supra, with the exception
that it removed therefrom the phrase
"where the causes alleged therefor shall be
natural or incurable impotency of the body
at the time of entering into the marriage
contract", and placed in paragraph 3113.
which gives the grounds for divorce and
not for annulment, the following clause,
being subdiv. 2 of the paragraph: "When
one of the parties was physically incompetent at the time •:•; marriage and the same
has continued to the time of the commencement of the suit."

Paragraph 2110 of the Revised Statutes
of 1SS7 dealt with the subject of annulment

The language of the statutes of 1901 in
regard to annulment and divorce, in so far

The court proceeds to quote from many
cases to this effect, and then continues:
"Many other decisions of like tenor might
be cited, but the foregoing are sufficient to
su*>w that the courts generally recognize
*r~: it is the common practice of bo'h
lor:s1a*v.res and courts to rrs-ke u«e of the
w.-rd 'vuivi' as interchangeable \vi*h, and as
having the meaning of, 'voidable/ and
*.v:*h subsMntially the same fnrre and effect; and that it is not only proper, but
that it is the duty of a court to interpret
the meaning of the word either strictly or
more liberally as the intent shall appear.
* * *»»

STATKv ANCLE
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as these matters are concerned, is identical not uncertain or fluctuating. Rev.Code 1928,
with that of the code of 1928. We think it | 1300, as amended by Laws 1933, c 12, | 1.
is clear that the legislature used the word
[Ed. Note.—For other definition! of
"void" in our annulment statute as refer"Manual Labor" tad "Mechanical Laring to marriages which were subject to
bor/* tee Words & Phrases,]
ratification or disaffirmance by the injured
3.
Master and servant 4=>69
party, as well as those which could not be
Whether workman la engaged In ••mechratified, including specifically in 1887, as
a ground for annulment, marriages of the anical" or "manual labor" within minimum
class to which that of the beneficiary be- wage law depends on generally accepted
longs, but that in 1901 it determined, for character of any given type of work, and
reasons best known to itself, that physical not on whether labor performed by parimpotency should no longer be a ground ticular individual has all the usual conditions of the type, and it is the general cusfor annulment, but rather for divorce.
tom and not the particular instance which
[12, 13] We hold, therefore, that it is determines the classification.
Rev.Code
now the law that while all other forms of 1028, f 1350, as amended by Laws 1933, c
voidable marriages are subject to annul- 12, f L
ment, physical incompetency existing at the
time of the marriage and continuing to 4. States 0=>I32
The principal purpose of financial code
the time of suit is not a ground of annulment, but of divorce only. As to what of 1922 was to prevent the incurring of any
reasons the legislature had for this change, indebtedness in excess of the amount approwe cnnr.o; say, but it is very cvidcr.t that priated by the Legislature. Laws 1922, c.
this was its intention, and the intent of the 35.
cas'J. the cause upor: which :he benehciary
herein secured an annulment of her marriage was not one authorized by law, and
the court, of course, had no jurisdiction to
render such a judgment. It necessarily
follows that the beneficiary is still the
wife of Ray Earl Menefee, and is not
entitled to set aside the lump settlement
which was made by her with the full
knowledge and approval of all the parties,
including- the respond-.:-.! herein.
The award is set aside and the case
remanded for further action.
ROSS, C J., and McALISTER, J., concur.
[™w>

S, States *=>t3?

Supreme Court of Arizona.
June 19, 1939.
substantial

6. States S=>I3I
A "general appropriation bill" can contain nothing but the appropriation of money for specific purposes, and such other
matters as are merely incidental and necessary to seeing that the money is properly
expended for that purpose only, and any attempt at any other legislation in the bill is
void.
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of
"Appropriation Bill," see Words k
Phrases.]
7. States *=»I3I
An attempt In a general appropriation
bill to repeal prior general legislation is invalid.

STATE et at. v. ANGLE.
No. 4078.

I. Pleading <3=>2I4(I)
Demurrers admit
tions of complaint

5. Statutes C=159
A later valid act of Legislature supersedes all previous acts with which it is in
conflict, whether or not it expressly repeals
the earlier provisions.

allega-

1 Master and servant <§=>69
Capitol gardeners, janitors, watchmen,
and engineer were engaged In "mechanical"
or "manual labor" within protection of minimum wage law, notwithstanding that their
tefure and total annual compensation were
91 P.2d—15

A provision in the financial code prohibiting state indebtedness in excess of
money appropriated unless expressly authorized by law was superseded by subsequently enacted general legislation fixing
minimum wages for manual or mechanical
labor, In so far as the two were in conflict.
Rev.Code 192S. § 2618, and | 1350, as amended by Laws 1933, c. 12, | L
9. States <£=>I32
A provision in the minimum wage law
requiring that certain wages be paid for
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OP UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
BOYD A. WARD,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

-vsRICHFIELD CITY, a municipal
corporation; RICHFIELD CITY
COUNCIL, a political subdivision
of the State of Utah; KENDRICK
HARWARD, individually and in his
official capacity as Mayor of the
Pichfield City Council; GLEN OGDEN,
individually and in his official
capacity as a member of the
Richfield City Council; KAY
KIMBALL, individually and in
his official capacity as a member
of the Richfield City Council;
REX WARENSKI, individually and in
his official capacity as a member
of the Richfield City Council;
DUANE WILSON, individually and in
his official capacity as a member
of the Richfield City Council;
NAD BROWN, individually and in
his official capacity as a member
of the Richfield City Council;
WOODY FARNSWORTH, individually and in
his official capacity as a member
of the Richfield City Council; and
DOES I through V,

Civil No:

C-82-0467W

Defendants.

Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and the
defendants1 motion for summary judgment were orally argued on May
20, 1983*

The plaintiff was represented by George E. Brown, Jr.

C-82-0467W

The defendants were represented by Ren Chamberlain and
Richard Chamberlain.

Following the hearing, the court took the

matter under advisement and has since reviewed the memoranda of
counsel and various of the cited authorities.

Based on the

foregoing, the court renders the following decision.
Plaintiff in this case is seeking partial summary
judgment on the first, second and third claims for relief in his
complaint, which arise from his termination as chief of police of
Richfield City in April 1981.

Because of perceived violations of

Utah's Open and Public Meetinqs Act, plaintiff sought to void the
cityfs council's action relating to his termination.

The state

district court ultimately declined to grant plaintiff's requested
relief because of S 10-3-911 U.C.A. which allows for removal of a
chief of police without cause.*

Plaintiff contends this statute

does not pertain to a city of the third class, such as Richfield
City.

Plaintiff has further argued that his civil rights were

violated under color of state law as a result of the manner in

1

Section 10-3-911 U.C.A. provides:
Removal of department heads. The chief of police or
fire department of the cities may at any time be removed, without
a trial, hearinq or opportunity to be heard, by the board of
commissioners whenever in its opinion the good of the service
will be served thereby. Its action in removing the chief of
either department shall be final and conclusive and shall not be
reviewed or called in auestion before any court. The city
recorder shall forthwith notify in writing the removed chief of
his removal, and it shall not be necessary to state any cause for
removal. From the time of notification the person removed shall
not in a$y case be entitled to any salary or compensation.

C-82-0467W

which the Richfield City Council terminated hin and by the
complicating factor that the Otah state district court did not
find it had jurisdiction to question the procedural manner in
which the city council conducted its business in releasing the
plaintiff.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment on the
four claims for relief in the plaintiff's complaint*

The

defendants essentially contend that federal courts are not to
redress violations of state laws under the Civil Riqhts Act, that
plaintiff has suffered no constitutional deprivation of property
or liberty, and that no actionable conspiracy exists*
Looking to the plaintiff's contentions, it is apparent
the plaintiff's principal claim is that the defendants have
violated procedural safeguards in Utah's Open and Public Meetinqs
Act in the process of terminatinq the plaintiff as chief of
police. While this court finds a question of fact exists as to
whether the Utah Public Meetinqs Act was violated, there is no
Question that federal courts will not, under the Civil Rights
Act, redress violations of state laws.

The Open Meetings law

establishes a state and not a federal interdiction.

See e.g.

Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944) (mere violation of a
state statute does not infrinqe upon the federal constitution);
Atencio v. Board of Education, 658 P.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1981) (a
breach of state procedural requirements is notf in and of itself9
a violation of the due process clause; an action under the civil
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rights statutes is not a plenary review of a challenged state
administrative procedure); Ybarra v, Barton, 647 F.2d 891 (9th
Cir. 1981) (state statute requiring hearing did not constitute
sufficient predicate under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to lack of
property or liberty interest); and Dorsey v, NAACP, 408 P.2d 1022
(5th Cir. 1969) (where rights are derived solely from state law,
their deprivation is not subject to a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983). Because this court finds it is without jurisdiction to
entertain plaintiff's claims that state procedural safeguards
were violated, a dispute as to exactly what procedure was
followed by the city council does not preclude granting summary
judgment on this issue.
Plaintiff next maintains he has been deprived of
certain constitutional rights because of his release or
circumstances surrounding his release.

Plaintiff contends not

only that he had tenure, but that because he was terminated in
such an unusual manner, an assumption is created that the
plaintiff had committed an inappropriate act, since the city
council consistently indicated the plaintiff had been a good
administrator, but dismissed him for "internal problems" in the
police department.

As a result, plaintiff asserts he has been

unable to procure employment as a chief of police in other Utah
communities, though he apparently has been elected as constable
for Sevier County.

C-82-0467W

To ascertain whether the plaintiff has been deprived of
a constitutional right under the facts of this case, the court
must find the city council's actions affected a property right or
a liberty interest of the plaintiff*

Bishop v. Woody 426 U.S.

341 (1976)j Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-71, 577
(1972).

Examining the property interest first, plaintiff

contends he had tenure until the next election under § 10-3-916
which provides:
In each city of the third class and in each
town on or before the first Monday following
a municipal election the Mayor, with the
advice and consent of the City Council/ shall
appoint a qualified person to each of the
offices of city recorder, treasurer and
marshal.
This court cannot agree with the plaintiff's reading of
the statute.

As applied to the present facts the quoted section

only empowers a mayor to appoint a marshal, though this court
does agree with the plaintifffs contention that the leqislature
has not clearly set out the process by which a marshal or chief
of police of a third class city is discharged.
The defendant contends S 10-3-911 is the appropriate
section for the release of a third class city's chief of police.
Plaintiff argues that section only pertains to first and second
class cities. While there is some indication the section can
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only apply to first and second class cities,2 this court also
notes that the use of the term "board of commissioners," rather
than "governing body," may have been inadvertent, as the
surrounding sections appear to be rather inartfully drawn.
This court finds helpful the Utah Supreme Court's
tangential look at S 10-3-911 in State v. Stavar, 578 P.2d 847
(Utah 1978).

Although it is not clear the court knew Helper,

Utah, was a third class city, it is apparent the Utah Supreme
Court had no reservations in indiscriminately applying
§ 10-3-911.
concurring).

IcL at 848. See also, id., at 849 (Wilkins, J.,
This is understandable in light of prior provisions

covering removal of a chief of police.

Since 1933 cities of the

third class or any city, for that matter, have been able to
remove the head of their police force without cause. Taylor v.
Gunderson, 154 P.2d 653, 107 Utah 437 (1944).

There is nothing

in the 1977 revision of the Utah Municipal Code to indicate to
this court the leqislature's intent has chanced.

Thus, under the

law of Utah, this court does not find the plaintiff had a
property interest in continued employment.

As it is this court's

opinion plaintiff's position as chief of police was terminable at
will, without cause, plaintiff did not have a property interest

2

The term "board of commissioners" is defined by the Utah
Municipal Code as being part of the governing body of first and
second class cities; "city council" is used for a third class
city. $£e SS 10-1-104(2) and (b); 10-3-103,-104,-105.
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in continued employment and no constitutional deprivation could
have occurred. See Bishop v. Wood, supra? Board of Regents v.
Roth, supra.
This court must also determine whether the plaintiff
has been deprived of a liberty interest.

It is undisputed that

the following news release was formulated by the city council
upon the termination of the plaintiff:
In a meetinq between the Richfield City Chief
of Police and the Richfield City Council on
Thursday, April 2, 1981, Boyd Ward, Richfield
City Chief of Police, was relieved of duty
effective April 3, 1981. It was felt by the
Mayor and the Council that internal problems
in the department made this change necessary.
The plaintiff also refers this court to a newspaper
article which appeared in the Deseret News April 4, 1981. The
article reads in pertinent part:
RICHFIELD - Richfield Police Chief Boyd
Ward has been relieved of his-post by the
city Council.
Mayor Kendrick Harwood was not available
for comment Friday, but a Councilman said
there had been internal problems in the
police department along with criticism and
letters to the editor in a local newspaper
that led to the firing.

The councilman praised Ward for his
administration (sic) ability and "buildinq a
fine police department," however.

Ward declined comment on his firing.
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The statement about the plaintiff being terminated for
internal problems in the interview with a council member has,
according to the plaintiff, caused significant damage in that the
plaintiff has been unable to refute the accusation against him in
order to find a new position as chief of police in another
community.

This court is aware that the Supreme Court held in

Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), that the
dismissal of a chief of police accompanied by charges that might
damage his reputation, without the benefit of a hearino, amounts
to a deprivation of liberty without due process of law.

Lookina

to the undisputed facts of this case, however, it is clear to
this court that this is not a case where the plaintiff's
interests in liberty have been implicated.

The council did not

relieve him of his position as chief of police on a charcre that
he had been guilty of dishonesty or immorality, nor does this
court see any indication whatever that the plaintiff's good name,
reputation, honor or integrity is at stake.

See Board of Regents

v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.
the plaintiff to be true,- under the Standards^«cpl^
Supreme Court this courtfind*
arising from the actionah-of

the-eity-covrff&rifc

It follows that if there has been no deprivation of
property rights or liberty interests, there can be no actionable
conspiracy.

It is axiomatic that there can be no cause of action
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for conspiracy under the Civil Rights Act where the acts
complained of, and the means employed in doing the acts, are
lawful*

See e.g., 16 Am. Jur.2d, Conspiracy $ 49.
In accordance with the above discussion, plaintiff's

motion for partial summary judgment is denied and the defendants1
motion for summary judqment is aranted.

' ntA

Dated this

If^— day of July, 1983.

David K. Winder
United States District Judqe

Mailed a copy of the foregoing to the following named
counsel this

/f~*_ day of July, 1983.

George E. Brown, Jr., Esq.
430 Contour Plaza
7001 South 900 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 841070
Ken Chamberlain, Esq.
Richard Chamberlain, Esq.
76 South Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701

Secretary

